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Executive summary 
 
Overall, monetary policy in Norway is quite successful. The interest rate setting in the 
past 2-3 years has contributed to a strong development of the Norwegian economy, 
without sacrificing price stability. Now, the issue is when and by how much monetary 
policy should be tightened, to avoid an excessive stimulation of the economy.  
 
Since the adoption of an inflation target five years ago, Norges Bank has been determined 
to learn and improve, as well as to being open and transparent. The Bank’s policy, 
analysis and communications have developed and improved over time. However, there 
are still some areas where we believe that things should be done differently, and these 
issues have received particular attention in our report. Our overall judgment is, however, 
that Norges Bank is doing a very good job.  
 
 
The objectives of the monetary policy  
 
Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation target, where weight is given both to low and 
stable inflation, and to stable output and employment. This is consistent with the 
Regulation on Monetary Policy given by the Government. The low inflation in recent 
years, considerably below the operational target of 2.5 percent, is caused by factors not 
anticipated by the Bank, and should not be taken as an indication of a monetary policy 
that is inconsistent with the Government Regulation.  
 
The Inflation report, which is the key policy document, states the Bank’s interpretation of 
the objectives for the monetary policy, which does not fully capture the content of the 
Government Regulation on Monetary Policy. In particular, the part about exchange rate 
stability is excluded. While low inflation as the operational target in general would be 
given priority if there were conflicting aims with exchange rate stability, exchange rate 
stability is also an objective of the monetary policy. As a matter of principle, the 
statement of the objective for the monetary policy given in policy documents as the 
Inflation Report should be complete. 
 
The Regulation on Monetary Policy should be interpreted in a forward-looking way, and 
past inflation discrepancies should not be compensated for in the future. Thus, the current 
policy strategy, which aims to take inflation gradually up towards the 2.5 percent target, 
does not violate the Regulation, even if it involves inflation considerably below the 
operational target for six consecutive years. 
 
The Regulation on Monetary Policy makes clear that Norges Bank should aim at low and 
stable inflation, and a stable development of output and employment. The current low 
inflation is not in conflict with these aims. The operational target of 2.5 percent inflation 
cannot justify a policy which jeopardizes stability of the real economy, nor do we believe 
that Norges Bank would do this. If Norges Bank were to conclude that low inflation is so 
persistent that monetary policy can not push inflation towards 2.5 percent and at the same 
time contribute to a stable development of the economy, the Bank should ask for a new 
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Government Regulation. We believe that the Bank would do this in such a situation. But 
we are far from this situation now. 
 
 
The challenges 
 
Recent literature on monetary policy does not provide unambiguous recommendations as 
to what extent monetary policy should be concerned about financial stability. Yet there is 
broad agreement that the evolution in asset markets and housing markets can serve as 
important indicators for future economic developments, and should therefore not be 
neglected in the decision making process. If fluctuations in asset and housing prices are 
amplified by the interest rate setting, this will have a strong effect on households’ and 
firms’ consumption and investment decisions, and may thus contribute to considerable 
volatility in the real economy. Such effects may be long-term in their nature, and may 
therefore not be taken properly care of within a three-year horizon.  
 
Norwegian asset prices are currently increasing quite strongly. While there does not seem 
to be any cause for alarm as yet, in particular as regards a possible systemic crisis, we 
believe current price increases to be unsustainable, and likely to adjust further down the 
line. This adjustment, most likely to come about by a flattening of prices, rather than a 
downright decline, is likely to dampen domestic demand, possibly causing volatility in 
the real economy. Viewed in isolation this calls for a tighter monetary stance than is 
currently the case. 
 
In contrast, the continued low inflation, considerably below the 2.5 percent target, calls 
for keeping interest rates low. What should Norges Bank do? 
 
The current low inflation does not entail significant costs to the society. Rather, it 
involves a possibility of reducing unemployment below the level that would otherwise be 
possible. However, the current strong monetary stimulus to the economy involves a risk 
that the upturn of the economy becomes too strong. The strong state of the economy is 
another indication that the monetary stimulus should be weaker than Norges Bank is 
planning for.  
 
The persistent inflation considerably below the 2.5 percent target has led observers to 
suggest that the target should be reduced, to avoid an expansionary monetary policy 
involving a risk of real instability.  In our view, the existing Regulation gives sufficient 
flexibility. Changing the operational target for the monetary policy should not be taken 
lightly. A change to a different numerical target would give an inappropriate signal of 
how a flexible inflation targeting regime should work.  
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Norges Bank’s Monetary policy assessments and strategy 
 
Publishing the Monetary policy assessments and strategy at the beginning of the strategy 
period has increased openness and transparency. The first chapter of the Inflation Reports 
seems its appropriate place. The content of the Monetary policy assessments and strategy 
should present and discuss the main concerns that lie behind the Boards decisions. In this 
respect, we miss a more thorough discussion of the labour market and wage formation, of 
the exchange rate, and of inflation expectations and various inflation measures. On the 
other hand, some elements, such as simple policy rules and monetary developments, do 
not seem to warrant an inclusion in the policy assessments. 
 
The fan charts indicating the uncertainty associated with the Bank’s forecasts are likely to 
underestimate the true uncertainty associated with the forecasts. Presentations of the fan 
chart should include a reservation that the assessment of the uncertainty is itself 
uncertain. If the Bank thinks that recent events indicate that inflation is more volatile than 
before, it should add a caveat about this when presenting the fan charts. The good track 
record of Professor Ragnar Nymoen’s inflation forecasting model, in spite of a simple 
approach with little labour involved, warrants further attention from the Bank. 
 
 
Monetary policy in 2002-2006      
 
Monetary policy operates with long time-lags. Thus, the effects of monetary policy 
decisions taken in 2002-04 are still being felt in 2005-06. Likewise, decisions taken in 
2005 must be judged in light of how the economy performs in 2006 and 2007.  
 
The outcome for the output gap and inflation in 2003 and 2004 suggests that monetary 
policy – viewed ex post - was too tight in the preceding 2-3 years. For 2005 the evidence 
is less clear. On the one hand, likely estimates for Norges Bank’s “loss function” suggest 
that a more expansionary policy would have yielded better results, on the other we 
remain convinced that further rate cuts in 2004 would have increased the present risk of 
overheating the economy. 
 
Throughout 2005, Norges Bank more or less held onto the strategy that was envisaged 
already by IR 3/04 in November 2004. In our view, this reflects in part that Norges Bank 
did a good job in its forecasts and policy analysis. However, the remarkable consistency 
in the strategy and interest rate setting over the last 16 months is also explained by the 
fact that the global economy has weathered the upturn in oil prices in recent years 
surprisingly well. Furthermore, the disturbances that have affected the Norwegian 
economy, have had opposite effects on the interest rate setting. While the recent surge in 
the oil price has contributed to the ongoing rise in domestic demand, continued changes 
in import patterns have contributed to keeping imported inflation low. The stability seen 
in Norges Bank's estimates over the last year for trading partners' growth is also found in 
the average forecasts for independent forecasters over the same period. 
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The Norwegian economy is currently into its third year of above-trend growth. Most 
sectors of the economy are expanding, some quite rapidly. Labour demand is picking up, 
and unemployment is very close to historic lows. While wage and price inflation thus far 
remain low, the present situation calls for somewhat tighter monetary policy than what 
Norges Bank currently indicates. High credit and asset price growth (see Chapter 3) 
strengthen this view. We believe that there is greater risk involved by hiking too little, too 
late, than by hiking too much, too early. In the latter case, it is relatively easy to reverse 
policy. In the former case, the longer one waits, the greater the likelihood that one has to 
tighten in greater steps, contrary to what the bank itself sees as a good way of setting 
interest rates. 
 
 
Communication 
 
Norges Bank is a good communicator. The Bank has taken a number of steps to improve 
its communication with the market and the public at large over the years, and it continues 
to do so. This reflects – as we see it – a genuine commitment to transparency and 
openness. While this may be viewed in light of the Bank’s role as a public body, taking 
decisions that are important for households and enterprises, it is also believed to increase 
the efficiency of monetary policy. 
 
Norges Bank’s communication with the market over the last year has been transparent, 
consistent and – overall – good. Market reactions to interest rate meetings have in general 
been slightly smaller than in previous years.  
 
We applaud the decision of the Bank to publish its own interest rate forecast, with effect 
from IR 3/05 on. This has a number of benefits, such as giving the best possible 
illustration of the optimal interest rate path, enhancing monetary policy efficiency by 
being more transparent, facilitate a cross-check with market forward rates, and leading to 
unbiased forecasts for other variables. Norges Bank has also received international praise 
for this step. While there are some possible arguments against publishing an optimal 
interest rate path, these are in our opinion of minor importance 
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1. Introduction 
 
Norway adopted an inflation target for the monetary policy five years ago, in March 
2001. Although some countries had pursued inflation targeting for many years, this type 
of monetary regime was still in its infancy. The theoretical understanding and practical 
skills have improved over time, not least in Norges Bank. Norges Bank has been 
determined to learn and improve, as well as to being open and transparent. The Bank’s 
policy, analyses and communications have developed and improved over time. 
 
After five years with a new regime, a brief summing up might be in order. How does 
inflation targeting work, compared to what we expected? The question is not really well-
defined, as the public debate prior to the change revealed that expectations varied widely. 
But forget that for the moment, and let us try to answer anyway.  
 
Overall, the regime has worked well, although this has varied over time. Unsurprisingly, 
as the inflation target replaced a target of exchange rate stability, the exchange rate has 
become more volatile. More surprisingly, as we adopted a target of 2.5 percent inflation, 
inflation has not become more stable; in fact, inflation has varied more than before. 
Mainly, this is due to larger shocks than previously. However, with hindsight, the tight 
monetary policy in 2002 contributed to pushing inflation far below the target.  
 
Another surprising issue is that we are now back in a situation where there is a conflict 
between the nominal target and the concern for stability of the real economy, as we 
experienced at times in the 1990s, under an exchange rate regime. While some 
proponents of an inflation targeting regime argued that it would essentially always 
contribute to real stability, we now see that there may be a conflict between the two aims.  
 
There are however also a number of positive elements. First, it is clear that the regime 
allows for considerable flexibility. It is possible to let monetary policy contribute to a 
stable development of output and employment, in addition to providing a nominal anchor 
for the economy. The relationship between the wage setting and the monetary policy now 
seems to work well, although after a difficult, and arguably costly, learning process. 
Furthermore, since late 2002, the monetary stimulus has contributed to an upturn in the 
economy, recently contributing to a reduction in unemployment, without a conflict with 
the nominal target. While there is now a risk that the upturn goes too far, we should not 
dismiss this overall positive development. Another clear advantage is that the current 
regime is much more robust to possible expectations of a change in regime, than an 
exchange rate target is. 
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T
organized Norges Bank Watch since 2000. Every year a group of experts is invited to 
write a report on the conduct of monetary policy in Norway. This is the seventh Norge
Bank Watch report. Its mandate reads as follows: 
 
Bank's conduct of monetary policy, given the mandate for the monetary policy
by the Government in March 2001. The committee should evaluate if the 
objectives stated in the monetary policy mandate concur with those expre
Norges Bank and whether Norges Bank uses its policy instruments efficiently in 
order to achieve the relevant objectives.  
 
T
present conduct of monetary policy. 
 
F
Bank.  
 
T
S
Finance. However, Norges Bank Watch 2006 is fully independent. The views and 
recommendations in this Report may not correspond to those of the Ministry of Fin
 
In
Regulation on monetary policy in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses the current challenges 
facing monetary policy, in particular the balance between financial and real stability on 
the one hand, and the inflation target on the other. Norges Bank’s Monetary policy 
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assessments and strategy, now the first chapter of the Inflation Report, is evaluated i
chapter 4. In chapter 5, we assess the monetary policy decisions of the Bank in 2002-
2006, with a focus on 2005. Finally, in chapter 6, we discuss Norges Bank’s 
communication, in particular with financial markets. A summary in Norwegia
provided at the very end of this Report. 
 
n 
n is 
 the work with this report we have met with people working in financial markets and in 
g 
in 
he views of the authors on specific issues are summarized throughout the Report. Also, 
In
Statistics Norway, as well as bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance and in Norges Bank. 
We have also benefited from a discussion of monetary policy with the Governor and 
Deputy Governor in Norges Bank. We take this opportunity to thank them all for bein
willing to share with us their time and insights as to the conduct of monetary policy in 
Norway. We are also grateful to Henrik Jensen for valuable comments and discussions 
the early part of our work. 
 
T
an opening statement is offered at the start of each chapter (except for this one) 
highlighting important issues and conclusions. 
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2. The objectives of the monetary policy  
 
Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation target, where weight is given both to low 
and stable inflation, and to stable output and employment. This is consistent with 
the Regulation on Monetary Policy given by the Government. The low inflation in 
recent years, considerably below the operational target of 2.5 percent, is caused by 
factors not anticipated by the Bank, and should not be taken as an indication of a 
monetary policy that is inconsistent with the Government Regulation.  
 
The Inflation Report, which is the key policy document, states the Bank’s 
interpretation of the objectives for the monetary policy, which does not fully capture 
the content of the Government Regulation on Monetary Policy. In particular, the 
part about exchange rate stability is excluded. While low inflation as the operational 
target in general would be given priority if there were conflicting aims with 
exchange rate stability, exchange rate stability is also an objective of the monetary 
policy. As a matter of principle, the statement of the objective for the monetary 
policy given in policy documents as the Inflation Report should be complete. 
 
The Regulation on Monetary Policy should be interpreted in a forward-looking way, 
and past inflation discrepancies should not be compensated for in the future. Thus, 
the current policy strategy, which aims to take inflation gradually up towards the 
2.5 percent target, does not violate the Regulation, even if it involves inflation 
considerably below the operational target for six consecutive years. 
 
The Regulation on Monetary Policy makes clear that Norges Bank should aim at 
low and stable inflation, and a stable development of output and employment. The 
current low inflation is not in conflict with these aims. The operational target of 2.5 
percent inflation cannot justify a policy which jeopardizes stability of the real 
economy, nor do we believe that Norges Bank would do this. If Norges Bank were to 
conclude that low inflation is so persistent that monetary policy can not push 
inflation towards 2.5 percent and at the same time contribute to a stable 
development of the economy, the Bank should ask for a new Government 
Regulation. We believe that the Bank would do this in such a situation. But we are 
far from this situation now. 
 
 
2.1 Norges Bank’s interpretation of the policy mandate 
 
The Regulation on Monetary Policy, as given by the Government on 29 March 2001, 
states that 
 
Monetary policy shall be aimed at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national and 
international value, contributing to stable expectations concerning exchange rate 
developments. At the same time, monetary policy shall underpin fiscal policy by 
contributing to stable developments in output and employment. 
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Norges Bank is responsible for the implementation of monetary policy.  
 
Norges Bank’s implementation of monetary policy shall, in accordance with the 
first paragraph, be oriented towards low and stable inflation. The operational 
target of monetary policy shall be annual consumer price inflation of 
approximately 2.5 per cent over time. In general, the direct effects on consumer 
prices resulting from changes in interest rates, taxes, excise duties and 
extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into account. 
 
In the Report to the Storting in which the Regulation on Monetary Policy was given 
(St.meld. 29, 2000-2001), it was made clear that the motivation for the new regulation 
was to ensure that monetary policy should contribute to a stable development of the 
economy. While the change from an exchange rate target to an inflation target implied 
that the operational target would be inflation, it was not motivated by a view that price 
stability should be given priority relative to exchange rate stability. Rather, it was argued 
that in a small open economy there would be a close connection between exchange rate 
stability and low and stable inflation.  
  
Norges Bank’s interpretation of its mandate in the introduction to the Inflation Report, 
reads as follows, 
 
Objective 
The operational target of monetary policy is low and stable inflation, with annual 
consumer price inflation of approximately 2.5% over time. 
 
In general, direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, 
taxes, excise 
duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances are not taken into account. 
 
Implementation 
Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation targeting regime, so that weight is given to both 
variability in inflation and variability in output and employment. 
 
Monetary policy influences the economy with long and variable lags. Norges Bank sets 
the interest rate with a view to stabilising inflation at the target within a reasonable time 
horizon, normally 1–3 years. The relevant horizon will depend on disturbances to which 
the economy is exposed and how they will affect the path for inflation and the real 
economy in the period ahead. 
It is pertinent to discuss to what extent Norges Bank’s own interpretation corresponds to 
the Government Regulation, in particular as Norges Bank does not publish the Regulation 
in the Inflation Report, which is the key policy document. While the Regulation is stated 
in the Bank’s Annual Report, and is also available on the Bank’s web pages, these are 
clearly less visible to the market and general public than the Inflation Report. 
 
Norges Bank is explicit that it operates a flexible inflation target, so that weight is given 
to both low inflation and to stable output and employment. This is clearly consistent with 
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the Government Regulation. The notable differences are that Norges Bank’s 
interpretation does not mention exchange rate stability, and that it specifies a 1-3 year 
horizon as the time horizon under “normal” circumstances. 
 
One argument for not mentioning the objective of exchange rate stability is that it to a 
large extent is ensured by the inflation target, and, if not, the inflation target should be 
given priority. For example, we cannot expect the nominal exchange rate between 
currencies with different inflation targets to remain stable over longer periods. In this 
case it is clear that the inflation target should be given priority, as the implementation of 
the monetary policy should be oriented towards inflation, in a forward looking manner. 
This is not to say, however, that the Bank should disregard exchange rate stability as an 
independent objective. In our view, the fact that exchange rate stability is specified as an 
objective in the Regulation, should be taken to imply that if there are large fluctuations in 
the exchange rate, this should be an independent factor in the interest rate setting, beyond 
the effect of the exchange rate on the rate of inflation.  
 
In NBW-05, it was argued that a clause about exchange rate stability in the Government 
Regulation, and Norges Bank reminding the market about it, may affect market 
participants’ expectations, thus contributing to exchange rate stability. Furthermore, it 
was argued that, as a matter of principle, the statement of the objective for the monetary 
policy given in policy documents as the Inflation Report should be complete, not 
excluding the part about exchange rate stability. We maintain this view. 
 
We find it appropriate for Norges Bank to mention a specific time horizon that will apply 
under normal circumstances. However, we would emphasize that the qualification 
“normal” should not be just an empty word. If the circumstances are such that a 1-3 year 
horizon for stabilizing inflation at 2.5 percent inflation may put stability of the real 
economy at risk, then it would be against the motivation of the Government Regulation to 
give priority to the 1-3 year time horizon. 
 
Since early 2003, inflation has been considerably below the 2.5 percent target. CPI-ATE 
grew by 1.1 percent from 2002 to 2003, then by 0.3 percent to 2004, and by 1.0 percent 
to 2005. Again, it is pertinent to ask whether this is consistent with the Regulation on 
Monetary Policy, which specifies the operational target to 2.5 percent. 
 
In our view, the discrepancy between actual and target inflation is not inconsistent with 
the Government Regulation. Throughout the period, the Bank has set the interest with the 
aim of realizing the inflation target within a reasonable time horizon. However, due to 
reasons not anticipated by the Bank, the rate of inflation has turned out to be considerably 
lower than expected. If the Bank had reduced the interest rate more sharply, it would 
most likely have led to higher inflation, thus reducing the discrepancy between actual and 
target inflation. Yet according to the arguments of the Bank, that would have led to a less 
stable development of the real economy. The Bank is given the task of weighting these 
two concerns against each other. While we, and previous Norges Bank Watch reports, 
have argued that the Bank at times might have set a different interest rate, the Bank’s 
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actual interest rate setting has clearly been within the range that is consistent with the 
Government Regulation.  
 
Note also that while Norges Bank has chosen to exclude energy prices in the measure it 
targets (CPI–ATE), on the motivation that these are likely to reflect temporary changes, 
the Government Regulation does not mention energy prices. Part of the recent increase in 
energy prices may reflect more persistent changes, including higher demand for oil due to 
higher growth in China and other countries. Thus, even if Norges Bank has chosen CPI–
ATE as the measure that it targets, the evaluation of whether monetary policy is 
consistent with the Government Regulation should also take into account that there are 
good reasons not to exclude energy prices. That would have made the discrepancy 
relative to the operational target given in the Government Regulation smaller. However, 
this point would not be relevant for the discrepancy between the policy target announced 
by Norges Bank (which is based on CPI-ATE) and actual rate of inflation. 
 
NBW’s view 
Norges Bank operates a flexible inflation target, where weight is given both to low 
and stable inflation, and to stable output and employment. This is consistent with 
the Regulation on Monetary Policy given by the Government. The low inflation in 
the recent years, considerably below the operational target of 2.5 percent, is caused 
by factors not anticipated by the Bank, and should not be taken as an indication of a 
monetary policy that is inconsistent with the Government Regulation.  
 
The Inflation Report, which is the key policy document, states the Bank’s 
interpretation of the objectives for the monetary policy, which does not fully capture 
the content of the Government Regulation on Monetary Policy. In particular, the 
part about exchange rate stability is excluded. While low inflation as the operational 
target in general would be given priority if there were conflicting aims with 
exchange rate stability, exchange rate stability is also an objective of the monetary 
policy. As a matter of principle, the statement of the objective for the monetary 
policy given in policy documents as the Inflation Report should be complete, not 
excluding the part about exchange rate stability. 
 
 
2.2      For how long can the rate of inflation remain below 2.5 percent? 
 
The discrepancy of actual and target inflation is however also likely to persist in the 
future. By Norges Bank’s own forecast, CPI-ATE will remain below the 2.5 percent 
target until the end of 2008. If this forecast is realised, inflation will have been 
considerably below the target value for six years. We argue below that the Bank should 
raise interest rates faster than they have indicated so far, which might lead inflation to 
remain low even longer. But for how long can the inflation rate remain below 2.5 percent 
without violating the Government Regulation?  
 
In the Report to the Storting in which the Regulation on Monetary Policy was given 
(St.meld. 29, 2000-2001), it was made clear that the target should be forward-looking: 
 15
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The Ministry stated that “The conduct of monetary policy shall be forward-looking and 
temporary disturbances that are not considered to have an effect on underlying price and 
cost inflation should not be taken into account….The provision is to be construed to mean 
that deviations between actual inflation and the target in a period shall not be 
compensated for in a later period. If inflation deviates significantly from the target over a 
period, Norges Bank shall set the interest rate with a view to returning gradually 
consumer price inflation to the target to avoid unnecessary fluctuations in output and 
employment.”  (http://odin.dep.no/filarkiv/260472/pmk_rap.pdf). 
 
In our view, the Bank’s current policy, as described in its Monetary policy assessment 
and strategy, corresponds very well with the Ministry’s directions. Thus, there can be 
little doubt that the Bank’s current strategy is consistent with the Government Regulation.   
 
A more difficult question is whether the Government Regulation would allow even more 
patience in getting inflation up. To answer this, we must go more thoroughly into the 
different parts of the Regulation. The Regulation makes clear that monetary policy should 
aim at stability in the Norwegian krone’s national and international value, and it should 
contribute to stable development in output and employment. In accordance with these 
aims, the implementation should be oriented towards low and stable inflation. The 
operational target should be annual inflation of approximately 2.5 percent over time, and 
extraordinary temporary disturbances should not be taken into account.  
 
The Regulation gives little indication of which of the different aims or parts that should 
be given priority if conflicting aims should occur. Some possible inconsistencies are 
discussed in the Report to the Storting (St.meld 29, 2000-2001). As noted above, it is 
clear that if the inflation rate deviates from target, stability in employment and output 
should be important when deciding how fast inflation should return to the target.  
 
In the current situation, the potential inconsistency is between the operational target of 
2.5 percent inflation, and a stable development in output and employment. The choice of 
an operational target of 2.5 percent was not motivated in the Report to the Storting 
(St.meld 29, 2000-2001) in which the Regulation was given. In subsequent policy 
documents (National Budget 2002) it was observed that 2.5 percent inflation was close to 
the average inflation in Norway in the 1990s. It was also observed that Great Britain and 
Australia had the same numerical target, the ECB had a target of inflation below 2 
percent, while in the US, there was no numerical target, and in the 1990s, average 
inflation had been around 3 percent. From these observations, we conclude that the 2.5 
percent target was not chosen because of any specific merit value was attached to this 
number. Rather, it reflected a view that an average annual inflation of about 2.5 percent 
would be consistent with a stable and satisfying development of the Norwegian economy. 
 
In the last few years, however, cheaper imports and high productivity growth have led to 
a rate of inflation considerably below 2.5 percent, even in a cyclical upturn of the 
Norwegian economy.  Norges Bank has attributed this to temporary disturbances, and by 
extending the time horizon for reaching the 2.5 percent target from two to three years, it 
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gave itself scope to take the stability of the real economy into consideration. However, 
for how long can a disturbance be viewed as extraordinary and temporary? 
 
There is no absolute upper number of years for how long a disturbance can last and still 
be viewed as temporary. In our view, the interpretation of the word temporary must be 
seen in connection with the other parts of the Regulation, in particular the main 
objectives of stability in the krone value, and contributing to stable developments of 
output and employment. As long as inflation below 2.5 percent can be attributed to 
temporary disturbances, there is no inconsistency in monetary policy giving priority to 
the main objectives. In fact, this argument could be taken even further: As long as 
inflation below 2.5 percent can be viewed as reflecting temporary disturbances, a 
monetary policy which gave priority to the 2.5 percent target, at the risk of instability in 
the real economy, would be in conflict with the Government Regulation. 
 
Note also that as long as inflation misses the operational target on the lower side, there is 
no inconsistency relative to the objective in the Government Regulation of stability in the 
krone’s value. In contrast, if inflation had been 1-2 percent higher than the 2.5 percent 
target, i.e. at about 4 percent, and remained so for several years, one could have argued 
that this would be conflicting with the objective of stability in the krone’s value. Thus, 
while the Norwegian monetary policy is usually thought to be symmetric around the 2.5 
percent target, and is stated as symmetric by Norges Bank (Gjedrem, 2001), one could 
argue that the Government Regulation gives less scope for persistent deviations of 
inflation above 2.5 than for persistent deviations below. 
 
In spite of this, we will not argue that one can accept a situation where inflation is below 
the target rate indefinitely. More specifically, if Norges Bank were to conclude that the 
factors contributing to low inflation were so persistent that monetary policy could not 
push inflation towards 2.5 percent and at the same time contribute to a stable 
development of the economy, the problem would be more acute. Likewise, if inflation 
had been below the 2.5 percent target for sufficiently many years that this was considered 
an important problem in the Norwegian society, something would have to be done. 
However, the answer should not be to pursue a more expansionary monetary policy that 
involved a clear risk of instability in the real economy. We do not believe that the Bank 
would do this, and in our view it would be inconsistent with the aim of the monetary 
policy as given in the Government Regulation. Thus, in this situation a new Government 
Regulation would be necessary. Norges Bank would, in our view, have an obligation to 
ask for a new regulation, rather than pursuing a monetary policy that involved a clear risk 
of instability in the real economy, cf. section 3 in the Norges Bank Act. The Governor 
confirmed to us that he is also of this opinion. 
Note, however, that in our view we are far from a situation where the Regulation should 
be changed, see section 3.4 below. Thus far, we can not conclude that Norges Bank’s aim 
to push inflation up towards 2.5% has violated the Regulation’s aim for real economy 
stability (although as we argue elsewhere, stability of the real economy may indicate that 
the stimulus should be smaller than now). Furthermore, it is our impression that the 
deviation from the 2.5 percent target is not considered an important problem in the 
Norwegian economy, disregarding a small number of people in the financial markets.  
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NBW’s view 
The Regulation on Monetary Policy should be interpreted in a forward-looking way, 
and past inflation discrepancies should not be compensated for in the future. Thus, 
the current policy strategy, which aims to take inflation gradually up towards the 
2.5 percent target, does not violate the Regulation, even if it involves inflation 
considerably below the operational target for six consecutive years. 
 
The Regulation on Monetary Policy makes clear that Norges Bank should aim at 
low and stable inflation, and a stable development of output and employment. The 
current low inflation is not in conflict with these aims. The operational target of 2.5 
percent inflation cannot justify a policy which jeopardizes stability of the real 
economy, nor do we believe that Norges Bank would do this. If Norges Bank were to 
conclude that low inflation is so persistent that monetary policy can not push 
inflation towards 2.5 percent and at the same time contribute to a stable 
development of the economy, the Bank should ask for a new Government 
Regulation. We believe that the Bank would do this in such a situation. But we are 
far from this situation now. 
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3 The challenges 
 
Recent literature on monetary policy does not provide unambiguous 
recommendations as to what extent monetary policy should be concerned about 
financial stability. Yet there is broad agreement that the evolution in asset markets 
and housing markets can serve as important indicators for future economic 
developments, and should therefore not be neglected in the decision making process. 
If fluctuations in asset and housing prices are amplified by the interest rate setting, 
it will have strong effect on households’ and firms’ consumption and investment 
decisions, and may thus contribute to volatility in the real economy. 
 
Norwegian asset prices are currently increasing quite strongly. While there does not 
seem to be any cause for alarm as yet, in particular as regards a possible systemic 
crisis, we believe current price increases to be unsustainable, and likely to adjust 
further down the line. This adjustment, most likely to come about by a flattening of 
prices, rather than a downright decline, are likely to dampen domestic demand, 
possibly causing volatility in the real economy. Viewed in isolation this calls for a 
tighter monetary stance than is currently the case. 
 
In contrast, the continued low inflation, considerably below the 2.5 percent target, 
calls for keeping interest rates low. What should Norges Bank do? 
 
The current low inflation does not entail significant costs to the society. Rather, it 
involves a possibility of reducing unemployment below the level that would 
otherwise be possible. However, the current strong monetary stimulus to the 
economy involves a risk that the upturn of the economy becomes too strong. The 
strong state of the economy is another indication that the monetary stimulus should 
be weaker than Norges Bank is planning for.  
 
The persistent inflation considerably below the 2.5 percent target has led observers 
to suggest that the target should be reduced, to avoid an expansionary monetary 
policy involving a risk of real instability.  In our view, the existing Regulation gives 
sufficient flexibility. Changing the operational target for the monetary policy should 
not be taken lightly. A change to a different numerical target would give an 
inappropriate signal of how a flexible inflation targeting regime should work.  
 
 
3.1 Financial stability 
 
 An important open issue in monetary policy, both in the academic literature and in real-
world interest rate setting, is to what extent central banks should take financial stability 
explicitly into consideration, by responding to asset prices and/or housing prices. It is 
tempting for the casual observer to argue that surging asset prices or housing prices 
should be met by a contractionary policy stance. Usually, the argument is that such asset 
price increases are the results of irrational market behaviour. 
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The recent theoretical literature on this issue, however, does not provide such 
unambiguous recommendations. A number of contributions have argued against the 
central bank responding to such movements. Some papers examine the performance of 
simple policy rules (like Taylor rules), which are amended by including a response to 
either an asset price index or a measure of housing prices. Through numerical 
simulations, it is then found that adding such a response in the Taylor rule does not do 
much in terms of economic performance (measured as output gap and inflation 
variability). In other words, if there is a booming asset market, it is likely to be associated 
with an expanding economy and higher inflationary pressure, so the demand-pull nature 
of the asset market change will be sufficiently dampened by a contractionary response to 
increasing output and inflation. There is no need to have a separate reaction to asset 
prices (see e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 2001) 
 
Other researchers have put forward a different view. Borio and Lowe (2002) argue that a 
central bank that is successful in keeping inflation down runs the risk that the credibility 
of the inflation target conceals the build up of imbalances in the real economy, increasing 
the risk of financial instability. Dupor (2003) shows that if an asset market burst is a 
result of systematically wrong (positive) perceptions by investors on future profitability, 
the associated investment inefficiencies can be an argument for reacting contrationary to 
the asset market evolution. In practice, however, the latter finding is difficult to handle. 
When is the observed increase in asset market prices “sufficiently inefficient” in order to 
warrant a monetary policy reaction? Only in a few instances (like the US stock market 
crash in 1987), it was fairly clear to most observers that the drop warranted a policy 
response. Undoubtedly, the easing of US monetary policy contributed to dampen the real 
consequences of the crash. 
 
However, the evolution in asset markets and housing markets can serve as important 
indicators of future economic developments, and should therefore not be neglected in the 
decision making process. Thanks to the wealth effect, a booming housing market is likely 
to lead to increases in future consumer spending, and under flexible inflation targeting, 
this should be met with a contraction in policy.  
 
It is also clear that over time, households and firms will adjust to a low interest rate, by 
increasing their consumption and investment, thus building up real assets and reducing 
financial assets. Growing asset and housing prices will stimulate the build-up of real 
assets, and also increase consumption. If, at a later stage, the interest rate increases 
considerably, households and firms will re-adjust, and consumption and investment will 
fall. Falling asset and housing prices may magnify the reduction in consumption and 
investment, contributing to a downturn of the economy. Such cycles can run over many 
years, and a 2-3 year horizon for monetary policy may not be sufficient to stabilise the 
economy. Furthermore, fluctuations in asset prices, housing prices and interest rates may 
also cause households and firms to make decisions on the basis of expectations that turn 
out to be incorrect, which may involve large costs to those who are affected. 
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There are abundant empirical evidence, both from Norway and other countries, indicating 
that periods of above-trend increases in asset prices, eventually lead to periods of 
flattening or declining asset prices, affecting demand and production along the way. In 
Norway these forces were last at play in the mid-1980s, affecting housing prices, demand 
and production for at least 6-7 years after housing prices peaked in early 1988. Other 
valid examples are the unification boom in Germany in the early 1990s and the Japanese 
credit-driven boom in the late 1980s, with the effects of both arguably still being felt in 
the property markets and therefore also in demand and production.   
 
These developments pose two types of risks.  
 
First, there is the systemic risk, emanating from potential defaults in the private sector 
and potential losses in the financial sector. Not only may these developments lead to 
undesired transfers of income and wealth, but they may also hamper the financial sector's 
central role as mediator of credit in the economy. As Norges Bank itself states on its 
home page: "Financial stability implies that the financial system is robust to disturbances 
in the economy and can channel capital, execute payments and redistribute risk in a 
satisfactory manner. Experience shows that the foundation for financial instability is laid 
during periods of strong growth in debt and asset prices." (http://www.norges-
bank.no/english/financial_stability/) 
 
Second, there is the adjacent risk to stability in the real economy. Periods of increasing 
asset prices are inextricably linked to periods of expanding credit. Quite often the 
causality runs the opposite way, as financial innovations and/or deregulations facilitate 
the access to credit. Higher assets prices and increased borrowing is positively correlated 
with demand as an expansion of credit can increase the consumption possibilities for 
liquidity-constrained households and enterprises. Yet pure asset price inflation cannot 
increase the economy's productive potential nor its long-term consumption possibilities. 
Hence, any near-term increase in consumption due to higher asset prices, must imply a 
softer consumption path at a later stage.  
 
A third, related, risk is that too low risk premiums may lead to an inefficient allocation of 
capital, over-investing in assets that will yield low future returns. 
 
The current situation in Norway has much in common with the situation elsewhere in the 
industrialized world. When the stock market bubble burst in 2000, central banks 
countered the subsequent global cooling by supplying abundant liquidity, pushing short-
term rates down to record-low levels (interest rate troughs in Germany, USA and Norway 
were, respectively, the lowest since 1872, 1958 and 1816). This led to the global "search 
for yield", i.e. the hunt for assets promising to deliver higher returns than the meagre 
decimals to be obtained on safe, short-term investments. Long-term rates and risk 
premiums for all kinds of assets were pulled down to historically low levels. 
Interestingly, while the stock market also turned the corner, easily explained by rising 
profits in the ongoing cyclical upturn, pricing relative to earnings has remained relatively 
conservative. This may be explained by the old proverb of "the burned child that avoids 
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the fire", as stocks may have become less popular this close to the largest post-war 
decline.  
 
On the other hand, money has flowed into the housing markets in most industrialized 
nations. In its latest half-yearly Economic Outlook, the OECD (OECD, 2005) secretariat 
notes that the current housing price booms in a number of industrialized countries has 
some noteworthy characteristics. First, it is unusually synchronised, with many nations 
experiencing booms at the same time, Second, it has lasted unusually long and price 
increases have, in general, been unusually large. Third, it has – at least for parts of the 
period – been counter-cyclical, while the normal pattern would be for housing prices to 
decline in the recession that ran from 2000 to 2003. The OECD is cautious in its 
assessment, but singles out five markets, that it judges to have overvaluated housing 
prices. Norway is one of these. 
 
According to the OECD, Norwegian housing prices were in 2004 about 18% higher than 
what could be explained by fundamental factors, such as interest rates, taxes, depreciation 
and expected returns. A brief look into Norwegian data show that housing prices, having 
risen by about 10% per year on average since 1993, is at their highest level relative to 
rents at least in the last 25 years. Relative to disposable income they are way above the 
average for the last 25 years. Estimates based upon Norges Bank's own housing price 
model indicate that housing prices in 2005Q3 were 7-10% higher than the model could 
explain (Financial Stability Report 2/05). However, this could be attributed to variables 
not included in the model, namely high dividends (a temporary factor) and expectations 
of a permanently low interest rate level. Since 2005Q3 housing prices have risen another 
5%. The fact that the banks have increased their lending relative to the market value of 
the collateral may also indicate that affordability is at low levels. 
 
Chart 3.1 
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construction starts for housing, are surging. In the commercial property market, expected
yields are pulled down to historically low levels. 
 
Thus far, we consider the systemic risk to be of m
 
inor importance. Bank’s balances are 
lid and losses are low. Overall, the financial situation in households and enterprises is 
  
uctuations in asset prices and credit is increasing by the day. There is no denying that 
rest 
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port, Kredittilsynet (2006) 
he Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway) stated that (our translation): ”Good 
… 
d 
rges 
 
em to attach more weight to developments in asset 
rices than Norges Bank does. In its Monthly Bulletin for February, the European Central 
King, Governor of the inflation targeting Bank of England formulated the risk 
lated to asset pricing this way in a speech January 16th this year (King, 2006): “…risk 
 
r 
so
satisfactory, as is thoroughly discussed in Norges Bank's Financial Stability report 2/05.
 
However, the risk of unnecessary large fluctuations in the real economy due to future 
fl
borrowers have an individual responsibility for assessing the risk related to higher inte
rates and/or adverse economic conditions. Likewise, lenders have a responsibility to 
assess the risk in their portfolios, to price risk accordingly, and to put aside reserves to 
meet a worsening of their balances. But common microeconomic behaviour on behalf
each of these groups – buying before prices increase further and maintain market shares
in a growing economy, may lead to unwanted results on a macroeconomic level. The 
households that in the future see the value of their homes flatten out will not go bust, but 
they will borrow less. And the bank that sees the market contracting will not necessari
lose money, but it will see its profits and activity falling.  
 
These views are not ours alone. On presenting its annual re
(T
economic conditions contributed to 2005 being a very good year for Norwegian banks
These good results imply that there does not appear to be any significant problems for 
the financial institutions over the near-term horizon… However, the picture is more 
worrying over the medium term. We are worried about the increasing risk due to 
increasing debt and housing prices. This means that the banks already in 2006 shoul
tighten its standards regarding housing loans, It would also be advantageous if No
Bank’s gradual interest rate normalization does not take too long time.” Kredittilsynets
head, Bjørn Skogstad Aamo, added that the words “not too” should be omitted from the 
“in small, not too frequent steps”. 
 
Interestingly, other central banks se
p
Bank, refers to mortgage borrowing (currently close to 12% y/y), stating that it “is 
particularly buoyant, implying a need to monitor developments in the housing market 
closely. Overall, strong monetary and credit growth in a context of already ample 
liquidity in the euro area points to risks to price stability over the medium to longer 
term.”  
 
Mervyn 
re
premia have become unusually compressed and the expansion of money and credit may
have encouraged investors to take on more risk than hitherto without demanding a highe
return. It is questionable whether such behaviour can persist. At some point the ratio of 
asset prices to the prices of goods and services will revert to more normal levels. That 
could come about in one of two ways: either the prices of goods and services rise to 
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“catch up” with asset prices as the increased money leads to higher inflation, or asset 
prices fall back as markets reassess the appropriate levels of risk premia. In neither c
would it be easy to keep inflation close to the 2% target.”  
 
As we see it, this issue is primarily not a question of whethe
ase 
r the bank should “target” 
sset prices or not. Rather it is, equivalent to the arguments we put forward in Chapter 5, 
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 central bank can, given some time, determine 
e rate of inflation. By increasing money growth, and by setting a low nominal interest 
rate, inflation is pushed up via three channels. The low interest rate stimulates domestic 
a
a question of which side one should err on. Currently, developments in asset prices call
for higher interest rates. 
 
NBW’s view 
R
recommendat
financial stability. Yet there is broad agreement that the evolution in 
and housing markets can serve as important indicators for future economic 
developments, and should therefore not be neglected in the decision making process.
If fluctuations in asset and housing prices are amplified by the interest rate s
it will have strong effect on households’ and firms’ consumption and investment 
decisions, and may thus contribute to volatility in the real economy. Such effects 
may be long-term in their nature, and may therefore not be taken properly care o
within a three-year horizon. 
 
Norwegian asset prices are cu
se
crisis, we believe current price increases to be unsustainable, and likely to adjust 
further down the line. This adjustment, most likely to come about by a flattening o
prices, rather than a downright decline, are likely to dampen domestic demand, 
possibly causing volatility in the real economy. Viewed in isolation this calls for a 
tighter monetary stance than is currently the case. 
 
 
3
 
Inflation, adjusted for indirect taxes and energ
im
and Asia, and high productivity growth, are key factors. In addition, the low inflation has
contributed to moderate nominal wage growth, which by itself is an important element in 
maintaining inflation low. By Norwegian standards the current situation with brisk 
economic growth and tighter labour market, yet very low inflation, is quite unusual. But 
can the low inflation persist, even if Norges Bank is determined to push inflation up
towards the 2.5 percent target? We will not make an inflation forecast, and will not argue
that inflation will continue to be low. However, we will argue that the possibility is th
and that the likelihood is not negligible.  
 
According to standard economic theory, a
th
 24
 N O R G E S  B A N K  W A T C H  -  2 0 0 6  
demand via higher consumption and higher investment, leading to higher output and 
lower unemployment, thus causing higher wage and price growth. Second, the low 
interest rate will reduce demand for the country’s currency, causing a depreciation that 
leads to higher import prices, in addition to improved competitiveness and increased 
activity in the exposed industries. Third, the low interest rate, and the explicit intenti
by the central bank of raising inflation, will raise economics agents’ expectations of 
future inflation, thus leading them to raise wages and prices more than they would hav
done otherwise.  
 
However, there are several reasons why these effects in some situations can be weak and
slow. As argued i
on 
e 
 
n box 3.1, the stimulating effect on the economy of lower interest rates 
ay have little impact on inflation in the short run, as the so called Phillips curve (the 
 
 by the domestic interest rate relative to the interest rate on 
ther currencies (i.e. the interest rate differential), and not by the domestic interest rate 
 
 
 economic agents to raise wages and 
rices more than they would have done otherwise, will also be weak or absent. The 
es 
m
negative relationship between unemployment and inflation) is likely to be relatively flat 
at low levels of inflation.  
 
Second, the effect on the exchange rate may also fail to materialise. One reason is that the
exchange rate is influenced
o
per se. Thus, if other countries set low interest rates, as our main trading partners have 
done in recent years, it is more difficult for Norges Bank to induce a weaker krone by 
setting a low interest rate. A further reason is that financial markets are forward-looking
so that even if the Norwegian interest rate is low now, financial markets may expect a 
higher interest rate in the future. The higher expected future interest rate will by itself 
contribute to keeping the krone strong. Finally, the strong state of the Norwegian 
economy, with a very high current account surplus by international standards, may also
reduce the likelihood that the krone depreciates. 
 
Third, if the direct effects on inflation from low interest rates are weak, and economic 
agents realise this, the expectations effect leading
p
survey of inflation expectations, undertaken by TNS Gallup on commission from Norg
Bank, gives mixed evidence on this (http://www.tns-gallup.no/arch/_img/211146.pdf). 
On one hand, most groups now expect higher inflation than before. Expected inflatio
two years from now, is 2.2 percent for economists, 2.6 for representatives from labour 
market organisations, 2.8 for business leaders, and 4.0 for households. On the other han
expected nominal wage growth, an important decisive factor behind inflation, is still 
rather low. Economists expect 3.9 percent wage growth in 2006, while representatives 
from labour market organisations expect 3.6 percent wage growth, and business leaders 
expect only 3.1 percent wage growth in their own firm. Households expect an increas
their salary or pension of 3.8 percent by the next year. If wage growth remains below 4 
percent, it will contribute to keeping inflation below 2.5 percent. 
 
n 
d, 
e in 
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Box 3.1 A flat Phillips curve at low levels of inflation  
 
There are several reasons why one would expect the Phillips curve to be relatively flat at low levels of inflation, i.e. 
that an increase in output is associated with a small increase in inflation, thus lending support to the idea that at low 
inflation levels, as in Norway, a boom will not be as inflationary as in high inflation times. Some of these reasons are 
based on quite different economic frameworks, which may suggest that the relationship is likely to be rather robust.  
 
Lucas (1972, 1973) consider models with flexible prices, where agents in the short run do not know whether a high 
price reflects a real shock, to which they should respond by changing output, or a nominal shock, to which they 
should not respond. Under highly variable inflation, shocks are more likely to be nominal, and thus agents should not 
respond. Hence, the economy is characterized by a steep Phillips curve. In contrast, if inflation is stable, a shock is 
likely to be real, and agents should change output, i.e. the Phillips curve is flat. As there is a close positive link 
between inflation variability and average inflation, low average inflation is associated with a flat Phillips curve. 
 
Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) analyse a very different setting, where firms pay a small cost of changing their 
prices (so called menu costs). If average inflation is high, all firms must update prices frequently to keep up with the 
rising aggregate price level. At low levels of inflation, prices might be updated less frequently, however. Hence, 
prices are stickier at low levels of inflation. This implies that demand changes are less likely to lead to price changes. 
Consequently, the Phillips curve is flat at low levels of inflation, but steep at high levels of inflation. 
 
Dotsey, M., R. King and A. Wolman (1999) explore a model related to that of Ball et al. (1988), but closer to the 
standard models of time-dependent price setting. The size of the menu costs is randomly distributed across firms, and 
the probability that a given firm will change its price is derived endogenously. This contrasts the usual Calvo scheme 
where the frequency of price changes is exogenous and state independent. The authors then show that the probability 
increases with average inflation, implying that prices are updated frequently under high inflation. This corresponds 
to quite flexible prices and thus a steep Phillips curve. At low rates of inflation, prices are updated less frequently, 
corresponding to rather sticky prices, and thus a flat Phillips curve. 
 
Elsby (2004) considers a model where firms set wages, but where nominal wage cuts are costly because of adverse 
effects on workers’ morale and productivity. Elsby shows that under low inflation, firms will be cautious when 
giving wage increases, because of a concern that a wage increase today will be costly to reverse in future periods, 
implying that wages may be too high in the future. In contrast, under high inflation, price growth will erode the real 
value of workers’ wages, and nominal wage cuts are less likely to be required, even if one gives higher wage 
increases today. Thus, wage increases will be more compressed under low inflation than under high, suggesting that 
the Phillips curve will be flatter under low inflation. 
 
A flat Phillips curve at low levels of inflation is consistent with Norwegian evidence that the Phillips curve is convex 
in the inflation – unemployment space, i.e. that an increase in unemployment has a weaker dampening effect on 
inflation the higher the initial level of unemployment, cf. Nymoen (2005). In other words, an increase in 
unemployment from three to four percent has stronger negative impact on inflation than an increase from four to five 
percent. 
 
Will the contribution to low inflation from cheaper imports persist? It may. One argument 
in favour is that cheap imports from low cost countries apply to a wider range of products 
than before. On the other hand, the structural changes that have led to cheaper imports 
will sooner or later be completed, and the low inflation impulse will then die out.  
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3.3 What should be done?  
 
If inflation remains considerably below the 2.5 percent target, how should Norges Bank 
respond? We shall argue that Norges Bank should pursue a policy that pushes inflation 
towards the target, but the force of the stimulus, and thus the resulting speed of the 
increase in inflation, should mainly depend on considerations of the real economy. In 
light of the current brisk growth of the economy, there should be a moderate tightening of 
monetary policy. There are several reasons for this view.  
 
An important premise, which we discuss below, is that the current low inflation is not 
costly to the society. This is not a sufficient argument for a tightening of monetary policy, 
as clearly the current brisk growth of the economy is not costly either. However, it is 
nevertheless an important precondition, as it would be harder for Norges Bank to be 
patient in raising inflation if there were large costs associated with the low inflation.  
 
Instead, we argue below that the low inflation in fact constitutes a golden opportunity to 
achieve lower unemployment than would otherwise have been possible, possibly leading 
to lower unemployment for many years in the future.    
 
With the aim of contributing to a stable evolution of the real economy, the current 
situation seems unbalanced. The economy is rather strong, with brisk economic growth, a 
positive output gap, and a tight labour market. The risk that a tightening of monetary 
policy causes a downturn of the economy seems small. While higher interest rates clearly 
will prolong the period in which inflation is below target, the costs are small, cf. the 
premise above.  
 
On the other hand, there seems to be a more definite risk that the upturn of the economy 
becomes too strong. Several issues are involved. A tighter labour market may lead to a 
too large increase in wage growth, which at a later stage necessitates a tightening of 
monetary policy. Asset prices may become too high, stimulated by low interest rates and 
optimism about future growth prospects, in which case a future fall will have a negative 
impact on the real economy. Finally, consumption and investment may stay above normal 
levels for several years, as households and firms adjust to low interest rates and high asset 
prices, implying that imbalances in debt and capital stocks build up. Eventually, the 
imbalances will require lower levels of consumption and investment, which may cause a 
downturn of the economy.   
 
Admittedly, the picture is not so clear that we can conclude that the economy is on its 
way to being overheated. Thus, the situation does not warrant that the Bank “pulls the 
brakes” by a large abrupt interest rate. However, “pulling the brakes” is not the issue, 
rather how hard to push the gas pedal, i.e. how strong the monetary stimulus should be. In 
our view, the strong state of the economy is a clear argument that the stimulus should be 
weaker, i.e. that the interest rate should be higher. Moreover, if one compares the risks 
that are involved, we suggest that Norges Bank should err at the tight side, and not at the 
expansionary side. As discussed in chapter 5, a tightening of monetary policy, above the 
rate indicated by the Bank, seems in order. On the other hand, we do not know for how 
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long, and by how much, the interest rates should increase. If the development of the 
economy turns out to be weaker than expected, and inflation remains low, the interest rate 
may remain below the neutral rate indicated by the Bank for a longer period. 
  
A possible argument against a tightening of monetary policy is that the inflation target for 
institutional reasons necessitates a faster increase in inflation. However, as argued in 
section 2.2, a moderate tightening of the monetary policy will, in our view, be in 
accordance with the Government Regulation in Monetary Policy, even if it may lead 
inflation to remain below target for several years.  
 
Below, we discuss the costs of low inflation and the possible gains in the form of lower 
unemployment. The more detailed discussion of the current economic situation, and the 
implications for monetary policy, is given in chapter 5. 
 
The costs of low inflation 
 
In NBW-05, it was argued extensively that the current situation with inflation 
considerably below the 2.5 percent target, does not involve any significant costs to the 
Norwegian economy. Let us in a headline manner repeat the main arguments given there.  
 
• The low inflation reflects cheaper imports and an improvement of terms of trade, 
not sluggish demand. Thus, while very low inflation might be a serious problem 
in a situation with sluggish demand, this is not the situation now.  
• Within one strand of modern monetary theory, deviations from the inflation target 
will distort relative prices, thus leading to inefficient resource allocation. This 
argument is logically coherent, but the effect seems negligible empirically in the 
current situation. 
• Inflation expectations might fall. However, the survey evidence reported above 
shows that they have not. And if inflation expectations were to fall, it would not 
be a serious problem, as it would allow a longer period with expansionary 
monetary policy and unemployment below its equilibrium rate, i.e. it would 
involve a gain to society. 
• Symmetry: By failing to push inflation up now, Norges Bank would lose 
credibility that would impair its ability to push inflation down in the future. 
Again, the argument is logically sound, yet it neglects that the problem is far from 
symmetric. In a possible future situation with both high inflation and high 
unemployment, there would be political pressure against high interest rates, and 
there might be uncertainty as to whether the Bank would be able to ignore this 
pressure. Yet pursuing an expansionary policy to raise inflation now says nothing 
about the Bank’s ability to ignore political pressure in the future. 
 
Overall, we conclude that while the Bank should aim at higher inflation, the absence of 
significant costs of low inflation implies that it can be patient, ensuring a stable 
development of the real economy. 
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Contributing to low unemployment in the coming years. 
 
The current low inflation constitutes an important challenge for the monetary policy. But 
it also constitutes an opportunity of achieving a gain that we would have thought to be 
infeasible, in the form of lower unemployment without adverse long-term effects. The 
argument is as follows.  
 
There is a broad consensus within the economics profession that there is a lower limit to 
the rate of unemployment that is consistent with stable inflation. For Norway, we have 
seen evidence of this lower limit at several instances in the past, where wage and price 
growth have increased sharply in a situation with tight labour market. In the economics 
literature, this lower limit has been given several different names; the equilibrium rate of 
unemployment, the natural rate of unemployment, or the NAIRU, but they all mean 
essentially the same thing. This equilibrium rate of unemployment is not given by nature, 
and it depends on how the labour market and wage setting work. For example, if the 
match between workers’ qualifications and employers’ demands improves, the 
equilibrium rate of unemployment falls.  
 
The equilibrium rate of unemployment is usually taken to be the labour market 
counterpart to potential production, implying that if unemployment is lower than 
equilibrium unemployment, this will usually correspond to a positive output gap. 
 
The equilibrium rate of unemployment is not the optimal rate of unemployment. 
Unemployment entails costs for the unemployed, and for the society at large. Thus, it 
would be desirable to have lower unemployment than the equilibrium rate. However, 
there is also a broad consensus within the economics profession that monetary policy 
should not be used as a means of pushing unemployment below its equilibrium level. If 
one were to do that, it would lead to high and increasing inflation, which would entail 
costs to the economy. Furthermore, if private agents expected the central bank to pursue 
an expansionary monetary policy causing unemployment to fall below the equilibrium 
rate, it could lead to higher wage and price growth. This would undermine the central 
bank’s ability to maintain unemployment below the equilibrium rate, and the only effect 
would be higher inflation. Eventually, it would be necessary to tighten monetary policy to 
pull inflation down, and that process might be very costly in the form of lost output and 
high unemployment.  
 
Precisely for this reason, central banks throughout the industrialised world in some form 
or another are given price stability as its primary objective. Central Banks should not try 
to push unemployment down at the cost of high inflation, and private agents should be 
confident that central banks will not do this. 
 
However, the current low rate of inflation in Norway makes this picture different. Norges 
Bank can pursue an expansionary monetary policy, pushing unemployment below the 
equilibrium rate, without sacrificing the inflation target. Indeed, it is by stimulating the 
economy and pushing unemployment down that inflation can be increased towards the 
target rate. In some sense, the current situation allows a free lunch. Unemployment can 
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be below the equilibrium rate for some time, while inflation is increased towards the 
target. 
 
From this perspective, what would be the appropriate monetary policy? One possibility 
would be to pursue a very expansionary monetary policy, causing a very tight labour 
market and thus a rapid increase in inflation. This alternative would have several 
disadvantages. First, it would involve a considerable risk that the expansion and 
corresponding increase in inflation went too far, so that inflation ended up too high. A 
period of tight monetary policy would then be required. Second, the gain of a very low 
unemployment over a short period of time is probably limited. Third, such policy would 
involve a large variability in the interest rate, which might increase the risk that 
investment, saving and borrowing decisions are made on interest rate assumptions that 
later turned out to be incorrect.  
 
It would seem much better to stimulate the economy in a more moderate way, involving a 
smaller, but more long-lasting reduction in unemployment, and a slower increase in 
inflation.  
 
One possible argument in favour of a strong expansion is that this might increase the 
likelihood that unemployed individuals with weak qualifications also could obtain a job 
that they might be able to hold on to. Thus, a strong expansion could involve “reverse 
hysteresis”, in the form of a permanent reduction in equilibrium unemployment (Ball, 
1999, argues that reverse hysteresis took place in several OECD countries in the mid 
1980s). However, one could also argue that a fairly tight labour market over a longer 
period might constitute a better opportunity for unemployed with weak qualifications to 
obtain a job. Thus, the reverse hypothesis might apply under this alternative too.  
  
NBW’s view 
The continued low inflation, considerably below the 2.5 percent target, calls for 
keeping interest rates low. What should Norges Bank do? 
 
The current low inflation does not entail significant costs to the society. Rather, it 
involves a possibility of reducing unemployment below the level that would 
otherwise be possible. However, the current strong monetary stimulus to the 
economy involves a risk that the upturn of the economy becomes too strong. The 
strong state of the economy is another indication that the monetary stimulus should 
be weaker than Norges Bank is planning for.  
 
 
3.4 Changing the inflation target?  
 
The persistent inflation considerably below the 2.5 percent target has led observers to 
suggest that the target should be reduced to 2 percent, as in Sweden and the UK (see e.g. 
Nordea, 2006). It is argued that the 2.5 percent target leads to a too expansionary 
monetary policy, which inflates property prices and involves a risk of real instability.  
 
 30
 N O R G E S  B A N K  W A T C H  -  2 0 0 6  
As argued in chapter 2, the Government Regulation should not be interpreted in a way 
that causes Norges Bank to pursue a monetary policy leading to real instability. The 2.5 
percent operational target should be viewed flexibly. Extraordinary, temporary 
disturbances should not be taken into account, and Norges Bank should give priority to 
the main objectives of price stability and stable developments in output and employment.  
 
Changing the operational target for the monetary policy should not be taken lightly. 
Stability in the policy framework is an advantage in itself, and changing the target may 
lead to expectations of new changes in the future. In particular, it is problematic to 
change the target in a situation where monetary policy misses the target. Such changes 
will inevitably lead to expectations that deviations from target in the future would also be 
“resolved” by changing the target. This could seriously undermine the credibility of 
monetary policy. 
 
The experience of the last few years indicates that in a small open economy, inflation is 
likely to be more volatile than we previously thought. With this in mind, a change to a 
different numerical target may give an inappropriate signal of how a flexible inflation 
targeting regime should work. The appropriate policy response to a temporary cost shock 
is to accommodate the direct effect on inflation, contributing to stability of the real 
economy, while ensuring that inflation gradually approaches the target rate. 
 
In financial markets, there appears to be a widespread view that it would have been better 
if Norway had the same inflation target as our trading partners, i.e. 1¾ -2 percent. From 
standard economic theory it is difficult to rationalize this view. There is a strong 
presumption in economic theory that higher inflation rates over time will be reflected in a 
depreciating exchange rate, with no effects on real exchange rates. A difference in 
inflation targets of ½ - ¾ percent on an annual basis corresponds to a depreciation of 3 – 
4.5 percent over a 6 year period. This is “small potatoes” compared to the exchange rate 
fluctuations we must expect under flexible exchange rates.  
 
Even if there is an international link of inflation rates that is not fully balanced by flexible 
exchange rates, in contrast to the presumption of standard economic theory, it is not clear 
that this would be an argument in favour of having the same inflation target as our trading 
partners. In fact, it might also involve an argument in favour of a higher inflation target 
than our trading partners. For instance, if wage setters in Norway in a situation with 
“normal” tightness on the labour market (i.e. unemployment equal to its equilibrium 
value) set the same wage growth as our trading partners, a higher inflation target than our 
trading partners, with room for higher wage growth, would allow us to have a tighter 
labour market, i.e. a lower rate of unemployment.1 The lower unemployment would be a 
clear gain for the society. 
 
                                                 
1 Note that the logic of the argument is the same as used by Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (2000). They show 
that in a world where some workers and firms are near-rational, so that they ignore small deviations from 
price stability, a low rate of inflation would be ignored by near-rational agents. Thus it would reduce wage 
pressure, and lead to lower equilibrium unemployment. 
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When contemplating a change in the operational target, one should not forget the inherent 
tendency in predictions about the future of being excessively influenced by 
contemporaneous circumstances. (For example, consider how predictions about future oil 
prices are linked to the oil price at the time of the prediction, and contrast this with the 
actual development of oil prices). In the current situation with increased imports from 
low cost countries and high productivity growth, low inflation seems a persistent 
phenomenon. In this situation, 2.5 percent inflation also gives sufficient room for 
nominal wage growth, so there is no risk that downward nominal wage rigidity causes 
higher wage pressure and higher unemployment (see Akerlof, Dickens and Perry, 1996, 
and Holden, 2004). However, while the current low inflation reflects an improvement of 
terms of trade for Norway, a change in the opposite direction may happen in the future. If 
the terms of trade deteriorate, and/or productivity growth falls, the additional nominal 
flexibility of a 2.5 percent inflation target might be necessary to avoid increased wage 
pressure. Recall also that only a few years ago, the argument was made that the inflation 
target should have been higher than 2.5 percent, to allow for more flexibility of relative 
wages in a situation where large structural changes would be required. 
 
In a country with large, wage-setting organisations, like Norway, a reduction in the 
inflation target should also be viewed in relation to the views of the labour market 
partners. A reduction in the target that is opposed by the wage setters may easily end up 
in a situation where wage setters aim at higher wage growth than is consistent with the 
inflation target, and the inevitable result is high interest rates and high unemployment. 
This does not mean that wage setters should have a veto right in the choice of inflation 
target, only that wage setters’ view is of importance. 
 
The costs of changing the operational target are however not so large that one should 
never change the target. If it becomes clear that the current target either cannot be 
realised for many years, or that it requires a monetary policy that is inappropriate on other 
accounts to realize it, then the target should be changed.  However, as is clear from the 
arguments above, this is in our view far from being the case. 
 
NBW’s view 
The persistent inflation considerably below the 2.5 percent target has led observers 
to suggest that the target should be reduced, to avoid an expansionary monetary 
policy involving a risk of real instability.  In our view, the existing Regulation gives 
sufficient flexibility. Changing the operational target for the monetary policy should 
not be taken lightly. A change to a different numerical target would give an 
inappropriate signal of how a flexible inflation targeting regime should work.  
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4 Norges Bank’s Monetary policy assessments and strategy 
 
Publishing the Monetary policy assessments and strategy at the beginning of the 
strategy period has increased openness and transparency. The first chapter of the 
Inflation Reports seems its appropriate place. The content of the Monetary policy 
assessments and strategy should present and discuss the main concerns that lie 
behind the Boards decisions. In this respect, we miss a more thorough discussion of 
the labour market and wage formation, of the exchange rate, and of inflation 
expectations and various inflation measures. On the other hand, some elements, 
such as simple policy rules and monetary developments, do not seem to warrant an 
inclusion in the policy assessments. 
 
The fan charts indicating the uncertainty associated with the Bank’s forecasts are 
likely to underestimate the true uncertainty associated with the forecasts. 
Presentations of the fan chart should include a reservation that the assessment of 
the uncertainty is itself uncertain. If the Bank thinks that recent events indicate that 
inflation is more volatile than before, it should add a caveat about this when 
presenting the fan charts. The good track record of Professor Ragnar Nymoen’s 
inflation forecasting model, in spite of a simple approach with little labour input 
involved, warrants further attention from the Bank. 
 
 
4.1 The content of the Monetary policy assessments and strategy 
  
From Inflation Report 1/03 on, Norges Bank started publishing its monetary policy 
assessments and strategy for the preceding four month period. As of Inflation Report 
2/04, the strategy was published in advance of the strategy period. NBW-05 briefly 
praised Norges Bank for improving communication in this way; here, we will give a 
more thorough evaluation. 
 
By publishing its policy assessments and strategy Norges Bank contributed to openness 
and transparency, making it easier for the market and the general public to understand 
and evaluate how Norges Bank thinks. By publishing the strategy at the beginning of the 
strategy period, Norges Bank took one further step towards increased openness. This 
helped the market and general public to understand its decisions when they were made, 
since the market and general public would already be aware of how Norges Bank viewed 
the situation. One important consequence would be that the market should be better able 
to predict Norges Bank’s decisions. This is consistent with our findings in chapter 6, 
although these findings clearly also reflect that the shocks have been smaller than before. 
 
Our evaluation of the Monetary policy assessments and strategy is based on the view that 
it should include the main concerns that lie behind the Board’s decisions. This is how we 
would expect the market and the general public to view the strategy. As of IR 3/05, this 
section is the first chapter in the Inflation Report, while it was in Chapter 3 in IR 1/05 and 
2/05. We find the new position better. However, it also implies that readers will not have 
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read the rest of the Inflation Report first, and it becomes more important that the 
Monetary policy assessments and strategy includes a discussion of the key aspects.  
 
The Monetary policy assessments and strategy in IR 3/05 includes a brief discussion of 
the development of the economy, with a focus on inflation and the output gap. It presents 
the baseline scenario, with ample discussion of the uncertainty associated with the 
forecasts, and also of two alternative scenarios. The presentation of the baseline scenario 
is valuable, see further discussion in chapter 6, as is the presentation of the uncertainty 
associated with the forecasts.  
 
There is a brief reference to the development of property prices and credit, making clear 
that Norges Bank is concerned about these issues. It is concluded that the concern for 
financial stability suggests that the interest rate should be increased towards a more 
normal level. 
 
We miss a more thorough analysis of the labour market and wage setting. The labour 
market is a crucial part of the economy, and wages are clearly a key part of the inflation 
process. While short run volatility in inflation often is caused by other aspects than wage 
growth, one would expect wage growth to be a more important factor behind persistent 
changes in core inflation. Furthermore, the labour market is also subject to important 
changes via increased influx of workers from new EU member states. We would also like 
to see  a discussion of the exchange rate situation, and the prospects for the future 
evolution of the exchange rate. Again, this is a variable that is crucial for the future rate 
of inflation, and thus also for interest rate decisions.  
 
In addition, we think that it would be appropriate with a brief discussion of inflation 
expectations. On several occasions, Norges Bank has stated how important it is to anchor 
inflation expectations, cf. e.g. last year’s Annual Address: “It has been important to 
prevent inflation expectations from falling and becoming entrenched at a low level.” Yet 
information about the development in inflation expectations, as measured by TNS Gallup 
on commission from Norges Bank, is generally absent from the Inflation Report. 
Although we would emphasize that one should be careful in the interpretation of 
measures of inflation expectations, as these may not reflect the “true” inflation 
expectations that form the basis of the key economic decisions, surveys of inflation 
expectations nevertheless provide information of value for monetary policy.  
 
Finally, we would suggest that the Monetary policy assessments include a discussion of 
various inflation measures. In its communication, Norges Bank has hitherto chosen to 
primarily focus on developments in CPI-ATE. For a number of years the bias to the 
interest rate setting was related to whether CPI-ATE in two, and then in three, years time 
deviated from 2½% (by anything more than 0.1 percentage points) or not. These days, the 
chosen interest rate path must lead to inflation reaching 2½% within three years to "look 
good". Again, CPI-ATE is the chosen measure. However, discussions with the Bank give 
the impression that the view applied in the internal discussions are much broader than 
this. A number of inflation measures are considered, and the target is not so much core 
inflation as it is overall inflation. In a way it seems that the Bank, communication-wise, 
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has painted itself into a corner, where the broader view applied in internal discussions 
takes second stage when the judgments are communicated externally. While various 
inflation measures are presented on pages 33-35 in IR 3/05, this discussion is not 
reflected in the Monetary policy assessments, and thus it assumes less importance. If the 
market and general public does not know or understand which weight the Bank attaches 
to the CPI – ATE relative to other inflation measures, this will impair their ability to 
predict the Bank’s behaviour. 
 
According to Norges Bank’s own guidelines its forecasted interest rate path should be 
cross-checked among other things against interest rates set by simple policy rules. 
According to Norges Bank, ”These simple crosschecks indicate that it may be appropriate 
to increase the interest rate gradually ahead to a more normal level.” That is an 
understatement, as the rules – the Taylor rule, the Orphanides rule and the rule with 
external interest rates - indicate that current interest rates are 1-2 percentage points too 
low (see Chart 1.11 in IR 3/05). We have mixed feelings about these cross-checks. On the 
one hand, they may indeed work as cross-checks, as they are largely model independent. 
(Although one should not over emphasize this point, as the rules are based on key 
concepts in the Bank’s decision framework, like the output gap and the neutral interest 
rate.) On the other hand, there are good arguments against using such rules to decide on 
actual interest rate setting. As argued by Norges Bank, the output gap is uncertain and the 
rules have limitations as a reference for a small, open economy, as higher interest rates 
would have led to an appreciation of the krone and therefore made it more difficult to 
reach the inflation target. A further possible problem regards communication. When, as 
now, there is a fairly large difference between the interest rate indicated by the rules and 
the one chosen by Norges Bank, how should this be interpreted? If the rules are that bad, 
why are they included in the Monetary assessments? And if the rules are not that bad, 
how come the Bank deviates that much in its interest rate setting?  
 
One may also question whether the discussion of money growth, measured by M2, and 
the relationship between money growth and prices, should be included in the monetary 
policy assessments. Norges Bank mentions that this relationship is unstable due to new 
financial market products, changes in credit market regulations and developments in 
international capital markets. Precisely for these reasons the discussion of M2 could be 
moved to other, less central parts of the Inflation Report. 
 
The policy assessments discuss two alternative scenarios, where the economy is exposed 
to disturbances. In Inflation Report 1/05, these scenarios are explicitly referred to as tests 
of robustness of the strategy, but this aspect is slightly downplayed in IR 3/05. In our 
view, the scenarios do not constitute a proper test of robustness. The disturbances are 
moderate in size and an appropriate interest rate response is undertaken about six months 
after the disturbance hits the economy. It seems unlikely that a baseline scenario that is 
on a path towards the inflation target will fail to satisfy a test like that. And if this is true, 
it does not constitute a test of robustness.  
 
On the other hand, the alternative scenarios can be useful as a pedagogical device, to 
illustrate how the Bank will respond to various disturbances that may take place. In that 
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sense, it could increase transparency and understanding of how the monetary policy 
works. 
 
NBW’s view 
Norges Bank should be praised for publishing the Monetary policy assessments and 
strategy at the beginning of the strategy period. The first chapter of the Inflation 
Reports seems its appropriate place. The content of the Monetary policy 
assessments and strategy should present and discuss the main concerns that lie 
behind the Boards decisions.  In this respect, we miss a more thorough discussion of 
the labour market and wage formation, of the exchange rate, and of inflation 
expectations and various inflation measures. On the other hand, some elements, 
such as simple policy rules and monetary developments, do not seem to warrant an 
inclusion in the policy assessments. 
 
 
4.2 The fan charts  
 
The policy assessments include the Bank’s view on the uncertainty of its forecasts,  
provided in the form of fan charts which show the probability distribution for the 
forecasts. In the policy assessments, it is stated that “The fan charts .. illustrate the 
uncertainty that can be expected based on recent history.“ From page 19-21 IR 3/05, it 
appears that the uncertainty is quantified based upon the uncertainty within a small 
macroeconomic model, on the basis of historical developments in the Norwegian 
economy, for the period 1993-2005. Furthermore, it is assumed that the errors are 
normally distributed.  
 
We will argue that the true uncertainty is likely to be greater than what the fan charts 
indicate. One argument for this view is the large forecast errors made in 2002 for the rate 
of inflation in several months of 2004, cf. NBW-05 page 48. These fan charts had about 
the same width as the most recent ones, where the 90 percent interval 2-3 years ahead is 
slightly above two percentage points. From the fan charts it appears that the forecast error 
in several months were more than three standard errors away from the point estimate, an 
event that has less than 0.3 percent probability of occurring. While unlikely events do 
happen at times, it seems hard to argue that the reasons for the low inflation were that 
extreme. It seems more appropriate to conclude that inflation uncertainty is higher than 
previously assumed, either because the previous assessment underestimated the 
uncertainty, or because inflation uncertainty has increased. Indeed, in his Annual Address 
2006, the Governor argued that we may “have to accept a somewhat greater variation in 
inflation and deviations from the target, as we have witnessed over the past two to three 
years.” 
 
Our conclusion that the fan charts underrate the true uncertainty is consistent with the 
analysis of Nymoen (2005). Nevertheless, Nymoen argues that the forecast failure was 
largely avoidable. Furthermore, he presents forecasts based on a small econometric 
model, which, even if coefficients are estimated in real time, were not subject to the same 
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forecast failure. In our view, the good properties of Nymoen’s model, in spite of a simple 
approach with little labour input involved, warrants further attention from the Bank. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box 4.1 Potential output and the output gap  
 
The output gap, defined as the difference between actual output and potential output, is a key concept within modern 
monetary economics, and in the theoretical framework embraced by Norges Bank. The traditional definition of 
potential output, also used by Norges Bank (see e.g. IR 2/04) is that it is the level of output that is consistent with 
stable inflation. Traditionally, potential output is measured as trend output, i.e. a smoothed value of actual output. 
Such measures are the basis for Norges Bank’s estimates of potential output, but the Bank also adjusts its measure to 
take account of aspects that are not well captured by a trend, like changes in regular working hours etc, see IR 2/04. 
 
However, while this is the approach taken by most central banks, there are important problems involved. These 
problems are acknowledged within the central banks, and also in Norges Bank, but it is fair to say that one has still 
not resolved them. 
 
One key issue is that in recent monetary theory, potential output is now defined as the level of output that would 
apply if all wages and prices were flexible, see e.g. Woodford (2003). (This was also pointed out in NBW-05.) Based 
on this definition, Woodford and others show that optimal monetary policy should aim at minimising a weighed sum 
of the inflation gap (i.e. inflation minus target inflation) and the output gap, as in the loss function presented in Box 
5.1. This has been taken as theoretical support for the traditional approach to monetary policy, where one aims to 
stabilise inflation and output. However, the problem is that the potential output found by traditional methods, a sort 
of trend output, is likely to differ considerably from the potential output as defined as flex-price output. Thus, the two 
approaches will involve different output gap measures, and consequently have different implications for the interest 
rate setting.  
 
A second problem is that estimates of the current level of potential output are likely to be highly uncertain, because 
the uncertainty associated with the measurement of the current state of the economy (see e.g. Orphanides and van 
Norden, 2002). For example, if actual output stagnates, estimates of potential output will be less affected, and the 
estimate of the output gap may become negative. This would suggest that monetary policy should be expansionary. 
Yet the stagnation in actual output may reflect a weak development of potential output, and a positive output gap, so 
that a contractionary monetary policy might be more appropriate.  
 
A further complication, recently shown by Cukierman (2005), is that under fairly plausible circumstances, flex-price 
output is likely to be more volatile than actual output. If central banks were to follow the theoretical prediction and 
target flex-price output, thus minimising the output gap, this would imply that monetary policy would contribute to 
more output volatility. As emphasised by Cukierman, this is something most central bankers would not want to do. 
However, Cukierman argues that the added volatility would involve a cost that is ignored in modern monetary 
economics, and that monetary policy in many cases would be better off stabilising output, as is the traditional 
approach. 
 
It is not clear which practical implications should be drawn from this. Hall (2005) concludes that potential output is 
not a useful guide to policy making. There is current research trying to measure flex-price output, which would be 
closer to the theoretical concept. However, Cukierman’s findings suggest that one should be careful before adopting 
flex-price measures of potential output. In our view, these unsettling issues provide an argument for an eclectic and 
broad approach to monetary policy, drawing widely from other parts of economic theory, and from a more common-
sense approach to policy making, as argued by NBW-05. 
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It is also noteworthy that similar fan charts published by Sveriges Riksbank have 90 
percent intervals that are almost three times as wide as those published by Norges Bank. 
However, the Bank of England publishes fan charts with 90 percent intervals of a similar 
magnitude to Norges Bank’s.  
 
It should be noted, however, that a somewhat more cautious presentation of the fan charts 
was given by Deputy Governor Jarle Bergo in a speech on 27th Januar 2006, where he 
concluded that “In other words, there are strict, model-based technical assumptions 
behind the fan charts we use to illustrate uncertainty in our forecasts. It goes without 
saying that it is difficult to be very precise as to exactly how great the uncertainty will 
be.” 
 
The policy assessments also include a fan chart for the interest rate set by the Bank in the 
strategy period. This fan chart reflects the reaction function of the Central Bank. To give 
a probability distribution for the interest rate, one has to take a stand on how the Board 
would react to various shocks that may occur. It is important that the fan charts are 
consistent with how the Board would react. For example, it would be misleading and 
unfortunate if the fan chart was constructed on the basis of a reaction function with very 
moderate use of the interest rate instrument, if the Board itself preferred to use the 
interest rate vigorously. However, the Bank confirms that the fan chart is constructed on 
the basis of a reaction function which is attempted to represent the recent decisions of the 
Board. 
 
NBW’s view 
The fan charts indicating the uncertainty associated with the Bank’s forecasts are 
likely to underestimate the true uncertainty associated with the forecasts. 
Presentations of the fan chart should include a reservation that the assessment of 
the uncertainty is itself uncertain. If the Bank thinks that recent events indicate that 
inflation is more volatile than before, it should add a caveat about this when 
presenting the fan charts. The good track record of Professor Ragnar Nymoen’s 
inflation forecasting model, in spite of a simple approach with little labour input 
involved, warrants further attention from the Bank. 
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5      Monetary policy in 2002-2006      
 
Monetary policy operates with long time-lags. Thus, the effects of monetary policy 
decisions taken in 2002-04 are still being felt in 2005-06. Likewise, decisions taken in 
2005 must be judged in light of how the economy performs in 2006 and 2007.  
 
The outcome for the output gap and inflation in 2003 and 2004 suggests that 
monetary policy – viewed ex post - was too tight in the preceding 2-3 years. For 2005 
the evidence is less clear. On the one hand, likely estimates for Norges Bank’s “loss 
function” suggest that a more expansionary policy would have yielded better results, 
on the other we remain convinced that further rate cuts in 2004 would have 
increased the present risk of overheating the economy. 
 
Throughout 2005, Norges Bank more or less held onto the strategy that was 
envisaged already by IR 3/04 in November 2004. In our view, this reflects in part 
that Norges Bank did a good job in its forecasts and policy analysis. However, the 
remarkable consistency in the strategy and interest rate setting over the last 16 
months is also explained by the fact that the global economy has weathered the 
upturn in oil prices in recent years surprisingly well. Furthermore, the disturbances 
that have affected the Norwegian economy, have had opposite effects on the interest 
rate setting. While the recent surge in the oil price has contributed to the ongoing 
rise in domestic demand, continued changes in import patterns have contributed to 
keeping imported inflation low. The stability seen in Norges Bank's estimates over 
the last year for trading partners' growth is also found in the average forecasts for 
independent forecasters over the same period. 
 
The Norwegian economy is currently into its third year of above-trend growth. Most 
sectors of the economy are expanding, some quite rapidly. Labour demand is 
picking up, and unemployment is very close to historic lows. While wage and price 
inflation thus far remain low, the present situation calls for somewhat tighter 
monetary policy than what Norges Bank currently indicates. High credit and asset 
price growth (see Chapter 3) strengthen this view. We believe that there is greater 
risk involved by hiking too little, too late, than by hiking too much, too early. In the 
latter case, it is relatively easy to reverse policy. In the former case, the longer one 
waits, the greater the likelihood that one has to tighten in greater steps, contrary to 
what the bank itself sees as a good way of setting interest rates. 
 
 
5.1 Monetary policy in 2002-04 
 
Given the 2-3 years lag inherent for monetary policy to have full effect, it is appropriate 
to view developments in 2005 and into 2006 in light of decisions made 2-3 years earlier, 
i.e. from early 2002 on. Having been discussed thoroughly by previous NBWs, we will 
only deal with them in broad terms here.    
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Norges Bank entered and left 2002 with a folio rate of 6.5%, having hiked 50bp in July 
after higher wage increases than expected, and a similar cut in December when economic 
activity faltered. This was followed by further cuts in 2003-04, first in six steps down to 
2.5%, then – after inflation failed to materialize as foreseen – in another three steps down 
to 1.75% by March 2004, which was maintained until July 2005. 
 
Chart 5.1 Chart 5.2 
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meet its targets of 2½ % core inflation and close to full capacity utilization, cf. Chart 5.3
Both the inflation gap (2½% target – actual core inflation) and the output gap were 
negative, indicating that a more expansionary policy in 2001-03 would have brough
closer to their targets. Also, higher capacity utilization would have led to higher 
employment over the same period. As these issues were dealt with in more detail
NBW-05, we will not repeat the exercise here. 
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Judging the policy results in 2005 is not as straightforward. Core inflation averaged 1.0% 
in 2005, i.e. 1.5%-points below the target. On the other hand, Norges Bank's latest 
estimates indicate a positive output gap of 0.3%. In Box 5.1, the outcome is evaluated 
according to a loss function often used in the literature on monetary policy. Here we 
show that under the assumptions given there, an outcome where inflation is 1.5% lower 
than target while the output gap is 0.3% requires that the Bank attached more than twice 
as large weight on output as it does on inflation. 
 
 
 
Box 5.1 Evaluating the 2005 outcome by use of a monetary loss function 
 
In the literature on monetary policy, central banks are often assumed to evaluate the outcome according to a 
nalizes deviations in inflation tput gap. A loss function of 
is type, often referred to by Norges Bank , is 
 
 
loss function which pe  from target and also the ou
th
L = ( - *)2 +  *(Y-Y*)2π π λ  
 
The appropriate policy depends on preferences regarding the output gap relative to the inflation gap, A 
higher value for the parameter λ indicates that the output gap is viewed as more harmful, and this will result 
in a smaller output gap, and thus a larger inflation gap (in absolute values) in optimum.  
 
The appropriate policy also depends on the tradeoff between the two gaps, i.e. the effect of a change in the 
interest rates on the gaps relative to each other. The tradeoff may vary over time, and in particular, it may 
depend on the response of the exchange rate to the change in the interest rate. But Norges Bank has 
provided some insight into how it sees this relationship, cf. Chart 5.5 in the main text, where the data is 
culled from IR 1/05, charts 3.5a-3.5b. Apparently, given the assumption that lower interest rates weakens 
the krone and increases inflation, later on leading to higher capacity utilization and further inflationary 
pressure, the relationship is about 1:2, i.e. that the effect on the output gap, measured in percentage points, 
is about twice as large one-two years ahead as the effect on core inflation. 
 
The analytically oriented reader will note that the optimal policy which minimizes the loss function is given 
by the first order condition  
 
2( *) 2 ( *) 0dL d dYY Y
di di di
ππ π λ= − + − =  
which, assuming 2 d d
di di
Yπ =
* 2 (
 (the effect on the output gap is twice as large as the effect on inflation), 
solves for )*Y Yπ π λ− = − − . Thus, the 2005 outcome of a positive output gap of Y- Y* = 0.3 and a 
negative inflation gap of π-π*= -1.5  is optimal if λ = 1.5/(2*0.3) = 2.5, i.e. that the output gap is valued as 
2.5 times as important as the output gap. Lower values of λ would give a higher optimal output gap, and 
thus a lower absolute value of the inflation gap. This is indicated in Chart 5.6 in the main text, which shows 
how the value of the loss function depends on the output gap for four different values of λ. We note that 
with equal weights attached to the two target, i.e. λ = 1, the optimal combination would have been an 
output gap of 0.7% and a corresponding inflation gap of 1.3%. Given the effect of lower interest rates in 
chart 5.3, this would imply that the sight deposit rate could have been ½-¾ %-points lower in 2002-03.  
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Chart 5.5 Chart 5.6 
Source: Norges Bank/DnB NOR Markets Source: Norges Bank/DnB NOR Markets  
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5.2 Interest rate setting in 2005 
 
Charts 5.7-5.10 show Norges Bank’s forecasts fo terest 
rate, the import-weighted exchange rate (I44  IR 
3/04 (November 2004) to IR 3/05 (Novem
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Chart 5.9 Chart 5.10 
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1¾% at the end of the four month strategy period, this was the way it was interpreted. 
 
While Norges Bank's growth forecasts for the international outlook was slightly lower 
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yet another indication of economists' tendency to underestimate the strength of 
endogenous forces both in upturns and downturns, perhaps failing to grasp the true 
ts 
for central variables have evolved over tim or a 
given year. 
 
Chart 5.11 Chart 5.12 
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While both domestic growth and the output gap were revised up, this had no 
consequences for the inflation outlook. Why? First, because the high growth failed to 
translate into considerably higher demand for labour, leaving unemployment estimates 
largely unchanged (Chart 5.13). Second, because Norges Bank again had to revise 
downwards its outlook for domestic wage growth (Chart 5.12). Low inflation, an influx 
of East European workers, the threat of outsourcing in manufacturing and zero growth 
public employment all contributed to this. To the Bank's defense, many of these were 
new factors, not easily seen, or quantifiable in advance. Finally, actual inflation was 
somewhat lower than expected in IR 3/04 (Chart 5.8). Therefore, despite the more 
positive growth outlook, maintaining the interest rate path from IR 3/04 in IR 1/05 
must be regarded as a policy step consistent with the strategy outlined in IR 3/04.  
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Chart 5.13 Chart 5.14 
Source: Norges Bank/DnB NOR Markets Source: Norges Bank/DnB NOR Markets   
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In
expectations, one may argue that the most consistent would have be
interest rate path from IR 1/05. This view is reinforced by the fact that Norges Bank 
maintained its view that rates would increase further after 2008, up to "an assumed 
normal level of 5½ % in the long term".   
 
However, maintaining the interest path from IR 1/05 would have involved a su
deviation from the forward rates at the time. With the import-weighted exchange rate 
having appreciated by about 2% since IR 1/05 (Chart 5.8), this could have led to further 
appreciation in the short run, increasing the risk that core inflation would remain below 
the target. 
 
The reduction in expected interest rates contributed to an upward revision of private 
consumption and mainland investments, and therefore also mainland GDP, in 2007 and 
2008 (Chart 5.12). But slightly weaker growth than expected in 2005 implied that the 
output gap was more or less unchanged on average over the forecasting horizon (Chart 
5.9), thus maintaining the assumed steam in the mainland economy, despite a more 
stimulating interest rate. In addition, expected unemployment was revised up both for 
2005 and 2006 (Chart 5.13) and expected wage growth was revised down (Chart 5.14). 
Consequently, also expected core inflation was revised downwards (Chart 5.16). 
 
Inflation Report 3/05 and strategy up to mid-March 2006 
On November 2nd, Norges Bank's Board delivered the next 25bp, raising the sight depos
rate to 2.25%. By this stage, market forwar
m
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higher than the one applied in IR 2/05, while the I44 assumption was more or less 
identical. GDP growth for trading partners was adjusted upwards by ¼ percentage point 
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NBWs view
Throughout 2005, Norges Bank m  less held onto the strategy that wa
e
th
remarkable consistency in the strategy and interest rate setting over the last 16 
months is also explained by the fact that the global economy has weathered the 
upturn in oil prices in recent years surprisingly well. Furthermore, the disturban
have affected the Norwegian economy, have had opposite effects on the interest
setting. While the recent surge in the oil
d
keeping imported inflation low. The stability seen in Norges Bank's estimates over 
the last year for trading partners' growth is also found in the average forecasts fo
independent forecasters over the same period. 
 
 
5
 
Current situation 
Evaluating the interest rate setting in 2005 also involves discussing whether the curren
interest rate and outlook for interest rates seem appropriate given the outlook for the 
domestic economy. We are not fully convinced that this is the case. 
 
The mainland economy is currently growing quite briskly. According to Statistics 
Norway, Mainland GDP rose by 3.1% in real terms from 2004Q3 to 2005Q3, and
a
indicate full year growth of 3.6% in 2005 and 2.7% this year. 
mainland trend growth of somewhat less than 2½%, the output gap, which Norges Bank 
estimated at ¼ % for last year, is likely to increase further this year. 
 
There are currently few signs of weakness in the Norwegian economy: 
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• Private consumption rose by 3½% last year and is broadly expected to show similar 
growth this year. Households' expectations are much higher than long-term averages. 
• Public consumption rose by about 2% last year and the same is expected for th
year. With current oil prices, the fiscal policy guideline (4% rule) opens up for an 
increase in the oil-adjusted deficit from NOK 66bn in 2006 to NOK 95 bn in 200
i.e. NOK 10bn in yearly increase of the deficit, equivalent to a stimulus of ¾ % 
Mainland GDP. While the Minister of Finance, Kristin Halvorsen, has hinted that th
government may actually use less than implied by the g
is 
9, 
of 
e 
uidelines, that remains to be 
seen. 
%. 
household net 
account of positive net revaluations.  
n 
hovering around 2½% and overall global growth a good 1½ percentage points above 
al exports are increasing. While national accounts show 
 monthly trade data to December points to a further 
 Orders are 24% 
xpected given 
• Housing prices continue to increase, at an underlying annualized rate of around 10
Housing starts rose last year to almost 32.000 units, the highest since 1982. There are 
yet no signs of housing activity leveling off, in spite of signals that the interest rate 
will increase over the next years.  
• Household gross debt rose by over 13% from end-2004 to end-2005. Overall credit 
growth is now the highest since early 1988. Adjusted for inflation, one is close to late-
1986 levels. Excluding the change in households' insurance claims, 
assets declined by NOK 13bn, even taking 
• Mainland enterprises' investments rose by some 7% last year and a similar growth 
is expected this year. Although both quarterly national accounts and the investment 
surveys are prone to substantial errors, this growth fits nicely with other reports 
showing improved business sentiment, higher profitability and increased constructio
activity other than housing.  
• Offshore investments rose by close to 20% last year, and the latest investment 
survey indicate an increase of 15% this year, to the highest level in volume terms 
ever. While most economic forecasters are currently expecting investments to decline 
from 2007 on (by 3-5% annually), it is clear that the current high oil prices will put 
upward pressure on oil producers' price assumptions, with a positive impact on 
offshore exploration and construction activity. 
• The global economy continues to show a great deal of resilience towards the many 
disturbances it has been exposed to post-2000, with growth in the industrialized world 
that. Consequently, tradition
a 7% increase y/y in 2005Q3,
pick-up in Q4. 
• The strong growth is also reflected in the manufacturing sector. While business 
sentiment three years ago was the weakest in a generation, expected production is 
currently the highest recorded in the sentiment survey's thirty-year history. Most 
manufacturing industries rate the general outlook as "very good".
higher than a year ago, primarily due to higher offshore investments, but export orders 
are also higher. Lack of equipment and (skilled) labour is increasingly seen as 
limiting production.  
 
Slow improvement in the labour market 
Up until last autumn, the domestic upturn seemingly had little effect on the labour 
market. Employment growth was much slower than what could be e
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overall production growth. Similarly, unemployment seemed stuck at around 4½%. 
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nt decline are still fresh. And it is likely that 
r the 
nd 
Several factors may explain the slow labour market response up to now. 
• First, increasing labour demand, in particular in the construction sector, has partly 
been met by an influx of Eastern European workers, following the EU enlargement
May 1st 2005. UDI data show an increase of about 5000 work permits both in 2004 
and 2005. In addition come foreign enterprises using foreign workers and 
unregistered workers.  
Second, as mentioned, public sector employment has remained more or less 
unchan
from 1970 to 2001.  
Third, average working hours have increased, due to three sets of factors: More 
overtime, less part-time work and a substantial reduction in sickness leave. Thus, 
increased demand for labour has to
hours rather than more employees. 
ile some of the above factors may be considered permanent, such as a continued 
igration from the new EU nations, others are probably not. Public sector employ
is now set to increase. It is likely that the decline in sickness leave will halt, as cyclical 
urns traditionally has led to increased sickness leave. And there are obviously limits 
h to overtime and increased full-time work. Finally, an improved outlook may in 
rease employers’ willingness to take on labour.  
In fact, there are now clear indications that the demand for labour is picking up. Firs
our force survey employment rose by an annualized 3% in the half-year to Decembe
t year. Second, a number of surveys, such as DnB NOR's annual enterprise survey, 
tistics Norway's manufacturing sentiment survey and NHO's half-yearly member 
vey all show increasing hiring ambitions. Third, a number of surveys and micro 
ervations indicate an increasing lack of skilled l
almost 22.000 unfilled vacancies registered at the labour market offices, 53% more than
e r ago, and the highest in five years. In construction and manufacturing the number of 
ancies has doubled in a year's time. Fourth, Aetat data also show an accelerating 
line in unemployment, with seasonally adjusted unemployment including ordinary 
our market measures declining by 16% over the last six months, against a 7% decline 
 
 inflationary pressure so far 
far, the tighter labour market has apparently not caused wage inflation to pick up. 
imates for last year are on average around 3½%, i.e. on a par with wage growth in 
4, which was the lowest in a decade. Quarterly data up to 2005Q3 supports these 
imates. Despite the increased pressure, there are many reasons to expect a moderate 
come of this spring's bi-annual wage negotiations. The "threat" from cheaper foreign 
ur prevails. Memories of the Sula
strengthening and manufacturing employme
the trade unions will avoid creating too much havoc in the first wage negotiations fo
new red-green government. Further, trading partners' wage inflation is around 3%, a
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domestic CPI inflation is low. Indeed, the largely blue-collar trade union LO has 
indicated that around 3% nominal wage growth would be in line with competitors' wage 
rowth and secure improved purchasing power in real terms. Current estimates for wage 
.e. 
on 
 
Th tiation 
rounds every second year tend to give higher wage growth than the intermediate ones. 
fol
ord therefore be willing to pay itself out of a possible conflict. High 
 
lea
per
wh rt 5.17 shown by an increasing share of factor 
come accrued by labour (“wage share”).  
ins low, pulled down both by a continued decline in 
port prices, currently around –½% y/y, and meagre "domestic" inflation, a result of 
mpetition and low wage growth. Clearly, inflationary 
ot 
ughly 
 
g
growth this year is in the 3½-4¼% range, with real wage growth in the 2-2½% range, i
a par with recent historical trends.  
ere are some upside risks to these estimates, however. The main wage nego
Traditionally, the engineering industry starts these wage rounds and set the frames for the 
lowing negotiations. This industry currently enjoys high profitability and record-high 
er reserves, and may 
profitability in later years and most likely high dividends, bonuses and wage drift for
ding employees may also worsen the climate for wage moderation. Historically, 
iods of high profitability has been followed by periods of decreasing profitability 
en the labour market tightens, in Cha
in
 
Chart 5.17 Chart 5.18 
Source: Norges Bank/DnB NOR Markets Source: Norges Bank/DnB NOR Markets   
 
 
Core inflation (CPI-ATE) rema
im
overall low inflation, increased co
pressures are, at best, very weak. Furthermore, current inflation continues to undersho
the 2½% target by a wide margin. 
 
Why raising interest rates? 
In the context of relatively high growth in the real economy on the one hand, and low 
inflation on the other, Norges Bank is confronted with a difficult balancing act. Ro
speaking, the Bank may commit two types of errors: Either tighten too much too early 
and risk strangling demand and fail to deliver the designated 2½% CPI growth. Or tighten
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too little, too late and risk a later overheating of the economy. In our view, the ban
would do better by erring on the former than the latter. 
 
First, there is no doubt that interest rates currently are below their neutral level. In IR 
3/05, Norges Bank indicated a neutral l
k 
evel of 2½ + 2½ = 5% (see above). Even though 
ne may argue that both the real rate and the inflation component may be lower than the 
 
 
ity 
 state 
 gives incentives to borrow and invest. As 
entioned, domestic credit growth is at an 18-year high, and households have negative 
financial investments adjusted for insurance claims. We will not argue that the household 
relatively solid financial balance overall. The 
normalization of interest rates. Likewise, ba
evaluating systems and high earnings ma
1990s, highly unlikely.  
 
However, as discussed in more
investments, as households and enterprises rush de when 
second-hand prices outsize replacement costs. 
interest rates. This process not only involves a risk of 
become blurred), but it also means that fu en 
interest rates eventually increase, and house
holdings to the higher interest rates, an investm ent 
bust, thus increasing the volatility of the real economy. Do we have such a 
using ly also in 
al estate construction.  
ed 
h, 
 
age growth down once it has picked up, and possibly 
lso raised inflation expectations. Further, while the globalization process has a long way 
nward pressure on Norwegian prices for a number of years 
on 
, 
o
indicated 2½%, it is hard to put forward empirical or theoretical arguments for neutral
rates below 4%. And normally in a cyclical upturn we would expect interest rates to be 
above rather than at, or below, their neutral level. As argued by the Governor himself, in 
last year's Annual address, "A real interest rate that is lower than the neutral rate will 
stimulate activity even after the effects of the interest rate fall itself have been exhausted."
By keeping interest rates at current low levels, the Bank is stimulating economic activ
at a point where such stimulus cannot be seen to be needed, cf. the description of the
of the economy above.  
 
Second, an interest rate below neutral levels
m
or enterprise sector is in immediate danger of becoming overburdened with debt, given a 
private sector is likely to cope well with a 
nks' tighter credit standards, improved risk-
ke a banking crisis, like the one seen in the early 
 detail in Chapter 3, high asset prices do lead to higher 
 to cash in on the profits to be ma
This effect is amplified by the current low 
over-investing (as price signals 
ture investments are brought forward. Wh
holds and enterprises adjust their capital 
ent boom will be reflected in a subsequ
investment 
boom now? It seems likely in the ho and secondary homes markets, probab
re
 
Third, while current inflationary pressure is negligible, the risks are, in our view, bias
to the upside. This relates in particular to the increasing demand for skilled labour whic
if not leading to high tariff increases this spring, may lead to high wage drift throughout 
the year, possibly leading to accelerating wage growth in 2007 and 2008. Experience tells
us that it might be costly to bring w
a
to run, most likely putting dow
to come, one cannot rule out that some of the greatest steps have been taken. Immigrati
from Eastern European countries is likely to continue, but not necessarily with the same 
speed as seen the latest years. Higher growth in the originating countries will, over time
make it less and less attractive to migrate. In China's case demographic factors imply that 
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the enormous reserves of "surplus" labour will be emptied, and that China already ha
ambitions to upgrade its labour force to increase value a
s 
dded per worker, as other Asian 
ations have done before them. 
n, 
e 
 
 
ge interest rate differential might lead to reaction from the retail 
vestors and borrowers, causing more fundamentally driven foreign exchange flows.  
mains low 
hat if imported inflation remains low? Table 5.1 below gives a sketchy picture of the 
 
n
One argument against raising interest rates now is that the exchange rate may strengthe
reducing imported inflation and weakening cost-competitiveness and hence activity in th
exposed sectors. This would dampen inflation, probably causing undershooting of the 
inflation target in three years time. But there are some caveats to this reasoning. 
 
We continue to believe that there is some room for manoeuvre for Norges Bank relative 
to European interest rates. The exchange rate is affected by a number of factors, leading
to volatility in the exchange rate that outstrips the effect of a moderate increase in the 
interest rate. For most fx traders, a moderate interest rate differential is of little interest, as
daily changes in exchange rates can easily wipe out any gain from positive interest rate 
spreads. In contrast, a lar
in
 
It is important to avoid a large, and possibly long-lasting positive shift in the exchange 
rate, as this may lead to an irreversible process of outsourcing manufacturing production. 
Therefore, our advice would be to maintain a cautious, step-by-step tightening process, 
by gradually increasing the interest rate and gradually signaling higher rates going 
forward.  
 
If imported inflation re
W
alternatives at hand. In the first column we have presented the weights in the CPI-ATE
attached to imported and "domestic" inflation. Statistics Norway labels the former as 
imported consumption goods. The split between the two is not straightforward since 
some domestically produced goods and services may be imported, and vice versa. 
 
Table 5.1 
 (1) 
 
Weight
(2) 
Norges 
Bank1)  
(3) 
Average 
1990-1999 
(4) 
Average 
2000-2005 
(5) 
Target 
being met 
Import prices 0.3 2.5 1.3 -1.3 -1.0
Contribution to CPI-ATE 0.8 0.4 -0.4 -0.3
ourly wage growth, Mainland N 4.5 4.6 4.8 6.1H
Productivity growth, Mainland N. 2.0 2.5 2.7 2.0
Domestic inflation 0.7 2.5 2.7 2.8 4.0
Contribution to CPI-ATE 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.8
Core inflation 2.5 2.32) 1.62) 2.5
1) See, e.g., Governor Svein Gjedrem's speech for NHO's Board, September 19th 2002. Here, only domestic 
wage growth was discussed. But if the model is to hold, imported inflation must equal 2.5%. 
2) CPI-AE, i.e. adjusted for energy prices, and not tax changes. 
 
 
In column (2) we illustrate Norges Bank's thinking around "sustainable" wage growth, as
presented e.g. for NHO's Board in September 2002: Given an inflation target of 2½% and
a trend productivity growth of 2%, there is room for a domestic wage growth of 4½%. 
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According to Norges Bank, this fits nicely in with the experience from the 1990s, with 
4½ % hourly wage growth (annual wage growth was 4.3%), 2% productivity growth, a 
stable exchange rate and an inflation of 2½%. Note that import prices were not discussed 
% 
rget was chosen in March 2001, Norges Bank wrote in its letter to the Ministry of 
d 
verage annual growth in hourly wages and productivity of 4.6% and 2.5%. However, the 
e 
) shows that in the period 2000-2006, domestic wage, productivity and price 
rowth were essentially as in the 1990s, while import price growth was much lower, 
t on average. 
? 
ular as 
e economy becomes more open over time, even if the decline in import prices does 
 room for higher wage growth.  
A scenario like this has been used as an 
e.g. Nordea (2006 ev  n a
or has been quite expl that the k will not pursue a m tary 
 up wage growth unsustai le rates. tter stra y is 
 more moderate nner, wh  eventual ill push
 via higher impo rices, an ssibly v  weaker k e. Note also that 
last 15 years has been c iderably ve 2%, ying tha  the 
BW’s view:  
he Norwegian economy is currently into its third year of above-trend growth. Most 
specifically, but if the model is to hold, imported inflation must be equal to domestic 
inflation, i.e. 2½%. 
 
Column (3) shows the empirical evidence for the period 1990-1999. When the 2½
ta
Finance that the target was close to the average inflation recorded for the 1990s. From 
1989 to 1999, consumer prices rose by an average of 2.4% per year. A measure of core 
inflation (CPI-ATE) is not available before 2000, but excluding energy prices consumer 
prices rose by an average of 2.3%. Over the same period prices of imported consumer 
goods on average rose by 1.3% annually (of which 0.2 percentage points may be credite
to a similar average annual appreciation of the import-weighted exchange rate). Domestic 
core rose by around 2.7% annually, somewhat higher than we would expect given the 
a
difference is not great in view of the many possible sources of errors, including that wag
and productivity growth is for mainland Norway, while inflation is measured by 
consumer prices, and that enterprise margins may vary over time.  
 
Column (4
g
leading to core inflation of 1.6 percen
 
But what if import prices continue to decline, with productivity growth remaining at 2%
In column (5) we have illustrated what it might take to achieve the 2½% target. Here, 
wage growth averages 6%, implying a real wage growth of 3½%, i.e. well over 
underlying productivity growth. This would clearly be a cause of concern, in partic
th
create some
 
argument that the inflation target should be 
er, wereduced, cf. ). How  do ot think th t this conclusion is 
warranted. The Govern icit Ban one
policy which aims at pushing  to nab  A be teg
to stimulate the economy in a  ma ich ly w  
inflation up, also rt p d po ia a ron
domestic inflation the ons  abo  impl t if
inflation target were to be reduced, combined with an increase in imported inflation, 
domestic inflation would have to fall considerably.  
 
N
T
sectors of the economy are expanding, some quite rapidly. Labour demand is 
picking up, and unemployment is very close to historic lows. While wage and price 
inflation thus far remain low, the present situation calls for somewhat tighter 
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monetary policy than what Norges Bank currently indicates. High credit and asset
price growth (see Chapter 3) strengthen this view. We believe that there is greater 
risk involved by hiking too little, too late, than by hiking too much, too early. In the 
latter case, it is relatively easy to reverse policy. In the former case, the longer on
waits, the greater th
 
e 
e likelihood that one has to tighten in greater steps, contrary to 
hat the Bank itself sees as a good way of setting interest rates. w
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6 Communication 
 
Norges Bank is a good communicator. The Bank has taken a number of steps to 
improve its communication with the market and the public at large over the years, 
and continues to do so. This reflects – as w  see it – a genuine come mitment to 
transparency and openness. While this may be viewed in light of the Bank’s role as 
a public body, taking decisions that are important for households and enterprises, it 
is also believed to increase the efficiency of monetary policy. 
 
Norges Bank’s communication with the market over the last year has been 
transparent, consistent and – overall – good. Market reactions to interest rate 
meetings have in general been slightly smaller than in previous years.  
 
We applaud the decision of the Bank to publish its own interest rate forecast, with 
effect from IR 3/05 on. This has a number of benefits, such as giving the best 
possible illustration of the optimal interest rate path, enhancing monetary policy 
efficiency by being more transparent, facilitate a cross-check with market forward 
rates, and leading to unbiased forecasts for other variables. Norges Bank has also 
received international praise for this step. While there are some possible arguments 
against publishing an optimal interest rate path, these are in our opinion of minor 
importance.      
 
6.1 Some general issues 
 
Norges Bank communicates to the market and the general public via a number of 
different channels. Most important of these is the Inflation Report, which contains key 
information about the economy, analyses of policy relevant issues, the monetary policy 
assessments and strategy, and so on. The monetary policy decisions are also 
communicated and explained in press conferences and press releases.  
 
The Annual Report serves a useful purpose by presenting the Bank’s own evaluation of 
its conduct. This report is submitted to the Ministry of Finance and communicated to the 
King in Council and to the Storting in the Government’s Kredittmeldingen (Credit 
Report). The Governor of Norges Bank provides an assessment of monetary policy in an 
open hearing before the Standing Committee on Finance and Economic Affairs in 
connection with the Storting deliberation on the Credit Report. 
 
However, the Bank also produces several other publications. The biannual report on 
financial stability provides key information and well executed analyses on the financial 
stability. The Bank also makes publications on specific issues of interest. Some of these, 
like the Staff Memos, are intended to encourage comments from colleagues and other 
interested parties. 
 
In addition to this, the Governor and Deputy Governor give a number of speeches 
throughout the country on monetary policy issues; in 2005, 22 speeches were given.  
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At times (once in 2005), the Governor writes newspaper articles.  
Norges Bank also arranges seminars and conferences, often with a broader or more 
onth was 
e 
orges 
k continues to deliver, both in reports and speeches, analyses that we, to 
ur best judgment, consider to be of good quality. These not only serve the purpose of 
e blic's understanding of how the economy works, they 
ro  Bank considers to be of importance and are 
orwegian 
 private sector 
 
elief that this 
 
ken a number of steps to improve its 
 
academic perspective, and less related to current monetary policy issues.  
 
In our view, Norges Bank continues to take noteworthy, and sometimes bold, steps, both 
large and small, in improving its communication with the market and the public at large. 
In addition to the optimal interest rate path discussed in more detail in section 6.3, we 
would like to mention 
 
• With effect from IR 2/04 the monetary policy strategy for the coming four-m
published. 
• With effect from IR 3/04 a box on page 2 lists both the Board meetings where th
strategy was discussed and the coming Board meetings for which the strategy applies.   
• With effect from IR 1/05 one introduced the six criteria for an appropriate future 
interest rate path, contributing to a further understanding of which factors that N
Bank considered to be of particular importance. 
• With effect from IR 3/05 the chapter on monetary policy assessments and strategy 
was moved to the beginning of the report, demonstrating that this chapter gives the 
essence of the report.   
 
Also, Norges Ban
o
broad ning and deepening the pu
lso p vide insight into what issues Norgesa
thus an integral part of the transparency the Bank adheres to. 
 
Norges Bank meets regularly with market actors. Every four months the inflation report 
is presented at meetings with analysts and traders in five cities - Oslo, Copenhagen, 
London, New York and Stockholm. Also, there are separate meetings with N
hief economists and chief dealers, both twice a year. In addition, somec
analysts are welcomed to the Bank on an individual basis. To our knowledge, this further
enhances the Bank's communication with the market and is therefore appreciated. In its 
one-day meeting with the Bank, NBW also met open and dialogue-oriented personnel.  
 
Overall, this provides a picture of a central bank that is determined to be open and 
transparent, and over the years have taken many steps, large and small, towards 
proving its communication. While such steps may be motivated by a bim
will enhance the efficiency of monetary policy, they are also bold, in the sense that by
being transparent and providing external observers with the analyses and judgments 
underlying its decisions and strategy, the Bank also makes itself more open to external 
criticism. 
 
BW’s view: Norges Bank has taN
communication with the market and the public at large over the years, and 
continues to do so. This reflects – as we see it – a genuine commitment to 
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transparency and openness. While this may be viewed in light of the Bank’s role as 
 public body, taking decisions that are important for households and enterprises, it 
.2 Communicating with the market 
n communicated at earlier stages; as well as all new "external" 
fo
fro nced interest rate path.  
On
 the 
per
wh tainty. 
An
fol f the decision. If the decision is anticipated, market  
actions should be muted. If not, Norges Bank has surprised the market. 
since some speeches by the 
overnor, most notably the Annual address, have from time to time also been used as an 
d 
ls 
ifferentials and, for that matter, in the exchange rate. 
 
a
is also believed to increase the efficiency of monetary policy. 
 
6
 
If Norges Bank’s communication is transparent, consistent and precise, each monetary 
decision should be regarded as a consequence of objectives, plans, forecasts and the 
Bank’s response functio
in rmation since the last decision. Only genuinely new information on economic 
developments since the previous interest rate decision should make the Bank deviate 
m the annou
 
e indication of the quality of Norges Bank's communication with the market is the 
view of market participants. In general, agents in the financial markets think highly of
formance of Norges Bank and regard the Bank as a relatively clear communicator, 
ere future actions may be predicted with some cer
 
other way to gauge the information is to consider the movements in market prices 
lowing the publication o
re
 
Norges Bank moves the markets 
One way to investigate the transparency of Norges Bank is to look at the change in key 
financial variables after a rate decision. This will not provide a complete picture as to 
how the Bank moves the market by its communication alone, 
G
occasion to provide signals on future interest rate setting. Table 6.1 presents the average 
daily changes in five such variables – the three month money market rate, the one- an
two year interest rate swaps, the 10 year government bond rate and the trade-weighted 
exchange rate (TWI). We have chosen to look at changes in the interest rate differentia
vis-a-vis Euro interest rates, thus excluding changes in domestic interest rates that are 
purely caused by external forces. If the change (or lack of change) in the folio rate was 
expected by the market, one would expect only minor changes in the interest rate 
d
Table  6.1  Daily changes in key financial variables (average absolute values) 
 3m diff, bp 1y diff, bp 2y diff, bp 10y diff, bp TWI, %
 events all events all events all events all events All 
1999 15 4 9 4 10 4 4 3 0.1 0.2
2000 6 2 4 3 4 4 3 2 0.2 0.2
2001 6 3 9 4 9 4 2 2 0.2 0.2
2002 12 3 12 4 10 4 3 3 0.2 0.2
2003 12 13 17 4 18 5 9 4 0.5 0.3
2004 4 1 6 3 7 3 4 3 0.3 0.3
2005 3 1 4 2 6 2 4 2 0.2 0.3
Avg. 9 3 10 4 10 4 4 3 0.3 0.2
Source: Datastream/DnB NOR Markets. Events indicate days with interest rate decision or key sp
while all indicate average for all trading days. 
eech, 
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On average, the spread between Norwegian 3m-, 1y- and 2y-interest rates and their 
European counterparts moves by 9-10 bp on days where events like interest rate meetings 
or key speeches take place, while the average for all days is 3-4 bp. However, there is no 
iscernible effect on the 10-year government bond rate or the trade-weighted exchange 
e, 
 in 
ing only look into the last twelve months or so. 
nding (same-day) changes 
es 
rate 
  
Chart 6.2 
 6.2 sh s the utcom intere  rate m etings and the parts of the 
ning statements that we see as most im ortant he un rlinin (bold es) ur 
 
d
rate. (The same applies to the EURNOK-rate.) 
 
Over the last six years, one year stands out; 2003 saw the largest changes in the folio rat
and also the largest changes in interest rates after meetings or speeches. Both 2004 and 
2005 have been relatively eventless in comparison. Yet, the market changes after 
Norwegian rate meetings continue to be somewhat larger than corresponding changes 
following interest rate meetings in UK, Sweden and the Eurozone. This was discussed
more detail in section 5.2 in NBW-05. Since NBW-05 also discussed the period 1999-
004 extensively, we will in the follow2
  
In the discussion that follows, we limit the study to changes in the one- and two-year 
interest rate differentials. The charts below show the absolute value of the changes in 
basis points (bp) in the folio interest rate on each rate meeting (the bulk of the 
bservations are zero), and the absolute value of the correspoo
in the one- and two-year interest rate differentials against similar Eurozone interest rat
(red dots). Also, a 20-day moving average of the latter is displayed. In addition to the 
2005.meetings, we have included the market reactions to the Annual address in 
 
Chart 6.1 
Source: D B NOR atastr R Markatastream/Dn  Markets Source: D eam/DnB NO ets 
 
 
Table ow  o e of the ten latest st e
adjoi p . T de g  typ is o
own. 
2004-06: Change in folio and 1y
d/d in bp vs euro 2y. Absolute value
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Jan.04 Jul.04 Jan.05 Jul.05 Jan.06
Folio 1y 20d mav
2004-06: Change in folio and 2y
d/d in bp vs euro 2y. Absolute value
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
Jan.04 Jul.04 Jan.05 Jul.05 Jan.06
Folio 2y 20d mav
 59
 N O R G E S  B A N K  W A T C H  -  2 0 0 6  
Table 6.2   Interest rate meetings 2005-06 (changes in basis points) 
Swap spre ads 
Date 
Rate 
ch. 
 
Key statement(s) 1y spr 2y spr 
2-F
200
rther interest rate reductions are 
now less likely. 
-1eb-
5 
0 [no] clear alternatives to leaving the interest rate unchanged. …The prospect of 
continued low inflation...implies that we should lag behind other countries in 
setting interest rates at a more normal level. …fu
-3
16-
200
-11Mar-
5 
0 …the interest rate can after a period, and then gradually, be brought to a 
more normal level. The sight deposit rate should be in the interval 1½-2½% in 
the period to the publication of [IR 2/05]. …further interest rate reductions are 
now less likely. The lower limit of the strategy interval has therefore been 
increased to 1½ per cent. 
-7
20-
200
9Apr-
5 
0 …assessments presented [in IR 1/05] indicate that the interest rate will rise after 
a period and at a gradual pace… Although a gradual rise in the interest rate 
seems to provide a good balance between the different objectives…it is too early 
to increase the interest rate at this monetary policy meeting. 
4
25-
200
0 1May-
5 
0 A development where the interest rate rises gradually - in small, not too 
frequent steps - was [in IR 1/05] considered to provide a good balance between 
the different objectives. The outlook for inflation and activity has not changed 
substantially since [IR 1/05]. As an alternative, [one] considered increasing 
the interest rate already at this meeting [but] did not find grounds…to deviate 
from expectations in the money and foreign exchange markets at present. 
30-
200
stabilising output and employment…the sight deposit rate should be in the 
interval 1¾ - 2¾% [up to IR 3/05].  
0Jun-
5 
+25 …a path where the key rate gradually – in small, not too frequent steps – is 
brought up towards a more normal level provides a reasonable balance 
between the objective of stabilising inflation at the target and the objective of 
-1
11
2 not too frequent steps – be brought
the] interval 1¾-2¾ per cent [up to IR
provide grounds for deviating from t
-2 -1-Aug-
005 
0 …assessment in [IR 2/05] was that the interest rate may gradually – in small, 
 up towards a more normal level…[and lie in 
 3/05]. New information… does not 
he…path envisaged.  
21-Sep-
2005 
0 …assessment in [IR 2/05] was that th
not too frequent steps – be brought
in] the interval 1¾-2¾ per cent [up t
Developments in output, demand an
with the projections in [IR 2/05]…
at this meeting, but we found it ap
unchanged.  
7 9e interest rate may gradually – in small, 
 up towards a more normal level…[and lie 
o IR 3/05].  
d underlying inflation have been consistent 
One option was to increase the interest rate 
propriate to leave the interest rate 
2-Nov-
2005 
+25 Interest-rate setting since this spring
increase in the interest rate – in sma
more normal level… this strategy
between the objectives of monetary 
strategy…is that the sight deposit rate sho  the interval 2-3 per cent in 
the period to the publication of [IR 1
-1 -2 has been oriented towards a gradual 
ll, not too frequent steps – towards a 
 still appears to provide a reasonable balance 
policy… The [IR 3/05] monetary policy 
uld lie in
/06]. 
14-
200  
emand and  
the projections in IR 3/05…There are prospects that the interest rate will increase 
further, in small, not too frequent steps. 
-5 -4Dec- 0 Developments in output, d  inflation do not differ substantially from
5
25-
200
monetary policy meeting in January or March, and further increases in the 
interest rate thereafter. New information…provides mixed signals…. The risk 
factors on each side seem to be somewhat more marked now, but do not as a 
whole provide grounds for changing the assessment of the outlook. 
0Jan-
6 
0 Monetary policy is oriented towards a gradual increase in the interest rate – in 
small, not too frequent steps – towards a more normal level… The analyses in 
[IR 3/05] implied an increase in the interest rate in the first quarter, at the 
-1
Source: Norges Bank, Datastream and DnB NOR Markets. 
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After the meeting on December 15th 2004, the Board said that "it would
nd
 exercise caution 
with regard to further interest rate reductions." In February 2  this was rephrased
ther
arkets rea core 
inflation fel  below 
stim y spread
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urban s post-
eeting pre ortant to 
prevent infl evel", that 
"we have ke ged 
behind othe  the 
Board meet hind other 
l level." Furthermore, the Governor 
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M
 cuts now being "less likely". Markets did not react to this. 
cted, however, when Statistics Norway on 10 February reported that 
l from 1.0% in December 2004 to 0.7% in January 2005, 0.6%-point
the e
de
ate given in IR 3/04, cf. Chart 6.3. Rate expectations fell, with the 2
 bp, and somewhat more the following days, cf. Chart 6.4.  
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, 
ith inflation staying ½ %-point below the IR-path would, according 
sitate an interest rate in the lower end of the 1¼-2¼% strategy interv
y maintaining the interest rate unchanged for a longer period o
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forward path. Given Norges Bank's signal on 2 February that fu
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 January inflation was more or less dismissed. Gjedrem said that "
rted to lower interest rates it would appear that inflation is moving up
tion is low, but the indices are als
e
dist
m
ces."  More important, a number of key sentences applied in previou
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stated that the folio rate was at its lowest level since 1816, that the real rate was below its 
assumed neutral level, and that this would continue to stimulate demand going forward
 
.  
arkets responded immediately. The following day the one- and two-year interest rate 
 
er the course of 
e next month, the one- and two-year differentials rose another 29 bp and 13 bp, partly 
fuelled by data from Statistics Norway showing good growth in the second half of 2004. 
following the March 16th meeting
behind other nations in normalizing interes f 
the four-month strategy period was lifted
explicitly stated that one should not interpret this as a hi
reflected that the previous
maintain the width of the band as before. Further, it was stated that te 
can after a period, and then gradually, be brought to a more normal level." ne- 
and two-year interest rate differentials fe
 
After the April 20th meeting Norges Bank confirm
that a rate hike lay in the cards: "…it is too ear
olicy meeting." The 1- and 2-year swap spreads rose by 4 and 9 bp, 
y May 25th, Norges Bank introduced the formulation that the interest rate should be 
iked in "small, not too frequent steps" – generally interpreted by analysts as meaning 
he 
her, 
 announced at the previous meeting. Also, the strategy of small, not 
o frequent steps was maintained. 
", 
n 
at 
M
differentials rose 15 bp and 23 bp, respectively. This was the single largest market 
movements last year. In light of the experiences with the December 2002 and June 2003
speeches – where new rhetoric was followed by immediate monetary action, markets 
were concerned that Norges Bank would not wait long before acting. Ov
th
 
But Norges Bank did not act according to market expectations. The press statement 
 flagged no alternatives and said nothing about lagging 
t rates. The interest rate interval at the end o
 from 1¼%-2¼% to 1½%-2½%, but it was 
gher central value. Rather, it 
 low end now was seen as less likely, and that one wanted to 
"…the interest ra
 Both the o
ll on the news, by 7 bp and 11 bp, respectively. 
ed the IR 1/05 strategy and indicated 
ly to increase the interest rate at this 
monetary p
respectively. 
 
B
h
25bp per four-month strategy period. The first rate hike was moving closer: "As an 
alternative, the Executive Board considered increasing the interest rate already at this 
meeting." By stating that the Board considered hiking, one signalled that rates most likely 
would be increased at the next meeting. By acting in line with market expectations, t
market reaction was negligible. Spreads barely moved at all.  
 
The 25bp hike on June 30th, the first hike in three years did not move the market eit
being largely seen as
to
 
With economic developments largely as expected over the Summer, no new signals were 
expected in advance of the August 11th meeting. Again, market actors were proven 
broadly correct, as Norges Bank stuck to the strategy of "small, not too frequent steps
and spreads barely moved at all. 
 
Economic developments over the next seven weeks were again broadly in line with 
expectations, but the gradual strategy implied that the next hike was approaching. O
September 21st Norges Bank said that "One option was to increase the interest rate 
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this meeting, but we found it appropriate to leave the interest rate unchanged." Market
actors interpreted this as the necessary confirmation that rates would be hiked by 25bp at 
the next meeting, and the two spreads rose 7-9 bp on the day before. 
 
OK exchange rate weakened somewhat. Further, the ECB hiked by 25bp December 5 . 
e 
 
e 
tatistics Norway released CPI data for December on January 10 . Core inflation fell 
tion 
d to rates 
 for a longer period of time, rates expectations declined markedly, with the 
y and 2y spreads declining 12-14 bp.  
g 
e 
 
ut do not as a whole 
rovide grounds for changing the assessment of the outlook." Having adjusted in 
 
 in 
m the other side, that market actors have bettered their 
nderstanding of Norges Bank's communication. This leads us to conclude that the 
d – 
 
This expectation was met when the Board hiked by 25bp on November 2nd and 
maintained the gradual strategy, consequently not affecting the market. 
 
During November and early December, economic data were indicating that the 
Norwegian recovery was gaining momentum. In particular, Statistics Norway's quarterly 
survey indicated higher offshore investments in 2006 than previously expected and the 
decline in unemployment seemed to accelerate. Also, the trade- and import-weighted 
thN
Therefore, several analysts and traders believed that Norges Bank at the meeting on 
December 14th might consider it appropriate to indicate a slightly faster pace of rate 
hikes, e.g. by stating that a rate hike had been considered. With rate expectations 
gradually rising at the same time as the NOK weakened, the timing of such a move 
seemed well-founded. But these developments failed to move the central bank. Despit
acknowledging expectations of higher interest rates among Norway's trading partners as
well as a weaker NOK, the bank stuck to its strategy. 1y and 2y spreads fell 4-5 bp on th
day, and another 3-5 bp the following day. 
 
thS
from 1.1% y/y in November to 0.9% y/y in December, the lowest since April, and 0.4%-
points below Norges Bank's prediction in IR 3/05 from November. Fearing that infla
again would fail to pick up as expected by Norges Bank, and that this would lea
being kept low
1
 
On January 25th Norges Bank maintained the interest rate, as expected. More surprisin
– at least to some analysts, apparently less so to the market – the press release said 
nothing about a hike having been considered. Rather, Norges Bank chose to focus on th
increased uncertainty surrounding the outlook in light of continued strong real economy 
data but surprisingly low inflation: "New information…provides mixed signals…The risk
factors on each side seem to be somewhat more marked now, b
p
advance, after the December CPI data, the cautious statement, which was seen as opening
the door for no hike in March if inflation should continue to decline, caused no market 
reaction.  
 
Table 6.2 and Charts 6.1-6.2 clearly shows that market reactions to the nine rate meetings 
in 2005 and the one so far in 2006 has been muted, compared to the movements seen
previous years. This can be taken as prima facie evidence that Norges Bank has become a 
better communicator, or, seen fro
u
communication with the market over the last year has been transparent, consistent an
overall – good. 
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We will nevertheless point out two incidents which illustrate that the communication 
could have been improved somewhat. The first of these relates to the market movements
after the CPI data for January 2005, including both the Annual address and the March 
16
 
 the low inflation 
ata than the market believed it to have. The market seems to be very concerned if CPI – 
nk 
es a broader 
erspective on inflation than it did previously, giving less weight to the key measure, CPI 
 CPI –
nd 
ber, 
ng. 
advance by stating that an alternative had 
een discussed. In our meeting with the central bank a very good explanation was given 
interprets information that the Board discussed 
n alternative as a signal or bias for future interest rate decisions, while this is not 
 
 as the 
at 
elopments pull in the one or the other direction. 
uent" 
which, frankly, is more oriented towards the insiders of the liturgy than the broad public 
th Board meeting. It seems that Norges Bank had more resilience to
d
ATE deviates from the path given in the latest Inflation Report, while Norges Ba
seemed largely unmoved. It is our impression that Norges Bank now tak
p
– ATE, and more weight to other measures. One indication of this change is that
ATE is, as of IR 3/04, no longer explicitly mentioned as the key measure at page 2 in the 
Inflation Report. However, to our knowledge Norges Bank has never communicated a 
change in its priorities. This makes it more difficult for market participants to understa
and forecast the Bank’s decisions.  
 
The second incident is the meeting on January 25th this year. After this meeting Norges 
Bank did not include a similar text that had preceded the hikes in June and Novem
namely that the Board, as an alternative, had considered hiking already at this meeti
While we obviously do not know the outcome of the next meeting, the fact that the 
overall assessment is maintained, makes it highly likely that the rate will be hiked by 
25bp. Therefore, it would not be inappropriate to maintain the apparent practice that was 
established last year, to signal a rate hike in 
b
for the omission, namely that the external communication should reflect the internal 
communication. Stating that a rate hike was discussed when this was not the case, would 
violate this principle. While we strongly support the principle that the external 
communication should reflect the internal, one must also be aware of the possibility that 
the market, sometimes for good reasons, interprets the communication differently from 
the way that it was meant. If the market 
a
intended from the Bank, then the Bank should make clear that the alternative does not 
constitute a signal.  
 
Likewise, over several years a practice has developed where some formulations put on 
more weight than others. Currently, the "small, not too frequent steps" is such a 
formulation. If this formulation were to be changed to, e.g., "small, gradual steps" by
"mere accident", unnecessary confusion would arise. One should add, though, that
Bank has started to publish its own optimal interest rate path, its communication may be 
linked up to this path, so the Bank may indicate whether it still adheres to the path, or th
recent dev
 
One of the economists we interviewed for this report expressed a desire for "plain 
Norwegian" in the bank's statements. We sympathise with his view. And after having 
established the optimal interest rate path, it would have been easy to say something along 
the lines of "The way we see things today, we will hike by 25bp either in January or 
March, and by another 75bp by March 2007." rather than the "small and not too freq
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that the Bank also addresses. While some seems inclined to believe that the large 
uncertainty inherent in the predictions is best communicated by being opaque, our view is 
, 
hich 
– to 
orges Bank’s communication with the market over the last year has been 
ts 
 
 
nd 
in 
full picture for the years 1999-2004.) This varying practice has been 
onfusing and made monetary policy less transparent. Such lack of transparency could 
rest 
s concerning Norges Bank’s 
terest rate setting in the longer term. This practice was maintained in IR 2/05, again 
onding 
ir 
the opposite: That uncertainty is best communicated by being explicit about it. Further
the more one wants to affect public expectations of future interest rates, the clearer it is 
advisable to be.  
 
Another example: In our meeting with Norges Bank, it was pointed out that the fresh 
Annual address contained a number of new signals on monetary policy, something w
must have gone unnoticed by the bulk of outside analysts and commentators, as none 
our knowledge – has referred to any changes. If so, one may ask whether the Bank has 
been clear enough about this in its communication. In this particular case, a sentence 
indicating that the speech contained some new judgments about the current monetary 
stance would have been helpful.  
 
NBW’s view: 
N
transparent, consistent and – overall – good. Market reactions to interest rate 
meetings have in general been slightly smaller than in previous years.  
 
 
6.3 Optimal interest rate path 
 
A central aspect of the communication process is what assumptions to base the forecas
for interest rates and the exchange rate on. The three previous NBWs -  NBW-03, NBW-
04 and NBW-05 – all addressed this issue, and all advised that Norges Bank should 
release an explicit policy inclination in the form of a projected “optimal” path for interest 
rates. 
 
Norges Bank’s practice over the last six years has varied considerably. Forecasts for two
central variables, the folio rate and the exchange rate have been based on a large number
of varying assumptions. Some forecasts have been based upon unchanged interest a
exchange rates, others on market forward rates or augmented forward rates. (Table 5.3 
NBW-05 provides a 
c
possibly create more market volatility.  
 
The first step towards an optimal interest rate path was taken in IR 1/05, when the inte
rate assumption applied deviated from the market forward rates after Q4 2006, cf. Chart 
6.6. The reason given for the deviation was that Norges Bank saw long-term rates being 
temporarily depressed due to special, primarily international, factors, and that they 
therefore did not provide an accurate picture of expectation
in
lifting the end-period interest rate a good ½ percentage point relative to the corresp
forward rate. Thus, both Inflation Reports clearly communicated to the market that the
expectations to future short-term rates were too low, given Norges Bank’s current 
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outlook, the bank’s interpretation of its mandate and its view on how the economy 
functions. 
The full, and most likely final, step was taken in IR 3/05, when Norges Bank for th
time published its own best guess on future short-term rates over the forecasting horizon, 
cf. Chart 6.6. Given previous NBW-recommendations, there is no surprise that we 
welcome such a move – without taking any credit for the decision. Norges Bank has also
received internati
e first 
 
onal praise for this, Svensson (2006a,b). 
ood combination of expected inflation and output – not 
the least considering the great uncertainty involved - no other could be better, as in 
 other one should have been chosen. 
rmation 
t and 
he very short 
end of the curve (basically the overnight rate), and since private sector decisions are 
based upon expectations of future interest rates, monetary policy can achieve more if 
 example: Throughout 2004 Norges Bank stated 
that one would “…lag behind other countries in setting interest rates at a more 
 rate 
 optimal path may be cross-checked with market forward rates. If they differ, it 
should, ideally, be possible to explain why. 
deviations from the path may be met with 
riticism that the Bank has misled the market and the public at large. Also, by failing to 
 
 
There are several benefits of publishing an optimal interest rate path: 
 
• It shows in a simple yet clear way the interest rate path that the Bank sees as 
providing the best balance between the various objectives of monetary policy. 
Although Norges Bank itself avoids the term “optimal”, we believe this term to 
accurately describe the nature of the path. While there might be many possible 
interest rate paths that give a g
this case the
• By communicating an interest rate path, and sticking to this, unless new info
should require a different rate setting, monetary policy becomes more transparen
thus more efficient. Since the central bank only control interest rates at t
it may affect market expectations. For
normal level”, thus containing expectations of a reduction in the interest rate 
differential and therefore possibly hinder an appreciation of the NOK. While such 
communication is helpful, it is obviously better to be precise about future interest
setting, reducing the possibility of incorrect expectations. 
• An
• All other predictions, based on this interest rate assumption, become unbiased, and 
not, as was often the case previously, biased to the upside or downside. They may 
thus be easier evaluated against and compared with other institutions’ estimates 
which in general are unbiased. 
 
An obvious argument against an optimal interest rate path is that it may work as a 
straightjacket for the Bank, since future 
c
“deliver” according to its predictions, the Bank may lose credibility.  
 
While neither of the two can be fully ruled out, good communication should help avoid 
this. First, by being explicit about the large inherent uncertainty in macroeconomic 
forecasts, in particular some years ahead, one may increase public awareness on the 
conditionality of the forecasts. Second, one may argue that an explicit interest rate path
and the adjoining commitment also invokes more central bank discipline, since a 
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deviation would have to be explained, by new information (“shocks”) or a new 
understanding of how the economy functions, or both.  
 
NBW’s view: We applaud the decision by the Bank to publish its own interest rate 
forecast, with effect from IR 3/05 on. This has a number of benefits, such as giving 
the best possible illustration of the optimal interest rate path, enhancing monet
policy efficiency by being more transparent, facilitate a cross-check with market 
forward rates, and leading to unbiased forecasts for oth
ary 
er variables. Norges Bank 
as also received international praise for this step. While there are some possible 
are in our opinion 
f minor importance.      
h
arguments against publishing an optimal interest rate path, these 
o
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7 Sammendrag av Norges Bank Watch 2006 
 
 
Samlet sett fungerer pengepolitikken i Norge godt. Rentesettingen de siste 2-3 årene har 
bidratt til en sterk utvikling i norsk økonomi, uten fare for målet om stabile priser. Nå er 
spørsmålet om når, og hvor mye, pengepolitikken bør strammes inn, for å unngå en 
overdreven stimulans av økonomien. 
 
Det er nå fem år siden Norge fikk et inflasjonsmål. I denne tiden har Norge Bank vært 
bevisst på å lære og forbedre seg, samt på å være åpen og transparent. Bankens politikk, 
analyser og kommunikasjon har utviklet og forbedret seg over tid. Fortsatt er det 
imidlertid noen områder der en kan mene at ting skulle vært gjort annerledes, og slike 
områder vil få spesiell oppmerksomhet i vår rapport. Hovedbildet om at Norges Bank 
gjør en god jobb står imidlertid fast. 
 
Mandatet til Norges Bank Watch 2006 er  
 
The objective of the Norges Bank Watch report of 2006 is to evaluate Norges 
Bank's conduct of monetary policy, given the mandate for the monetary policy set 
by the Government in March 2001. The committee should evaluate if the 
objectives stated in the monetary policy mandate concur with those expressed by 
Norges Bank and whether Norges Bank uses its policy instruments efficiently in 
order to achieve the relevant objectives.  
 
The committee should also address other issues that it may find relevant for the 
present conduct of monetary policy. 
 
Finally, the committee should evaluate the communication strategy of Norges 
Bank.  
 
The report shall be presented at a press conference no later than 1 June 2006. 
 
 
Målsettingene for pengepolitikken 
 
Norges Bank har et fleksibelt inflasjonsmål, der det legges vekt både på lav og stabil 
inflasjon, og stabil produksjon og sysselsetting. Dette er i samsvar med forskriften for 
pengepolitikken gitt av Regjeringen. Den lave inflasjonen de siste årene, betydelig under 
det operative målet på 2,5 prosent, er forårsaket av faktorer som Banken ikke forutså, og 
kan ikke tas som tegn på at pengepolitikken avviker fra Regjeringens forskrift. 
 
I Inflasjonsrapporten, som er det sentrale politikkdokumentet, redegjør Norges Bank for 
sin tolkning av målene for pengepolitikken. Bankens tolkning dekker ikke innholdet i 
Regjeringens forskrift fullt ut, og det er særlig punktet om valutakursstabilitet som er 
utelatt. Selv om lav inflasjon som operativt mål vanligvis vil bli prioritert ved eventuelle 
målkonflikter i forhold til hensynet til stabilitet i valutakursen, så er stabil valutakurs også 
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en etting for pengepolitikken. Politikkdokumenter som Inflasjon
je ålsettingene for pengepolitikken i sin helhet. 
måls srapporten bør 
ngi m
 
 
 at pengepolitikken ikke kan 
tidig bidra til en stabil utvikling i 
ift for pengepolitikken. Vi tror at Banken 
ille gj
 
 
Utford
 
Nyere l
pengepolitikken skal ta hensyn til finansiell stab t. Likevel er det bred enighet om at 
utviklin
fremtid
Hvis svingninger i prisene på verdipapirer og boliger blir forsterket av rentesettingen, vil 
dette ha
investe
Slike sammenhenger kan være langvarige, og de vil derfor kunne få for lite 
oppmer
orske formuespriser øker nå kraftig. Selv om dette ennå ikke ser ut til å innebære noen 
rlig ikke for en systemkrise, så tror vi at dagens 
isstigningstakten vil etter hvert justeres, mer 
e 
g
 
Forskriften for pengepolitikken skal tolkes som framoverskuende, og avvik fra målet skal
ikke kompenseres for i ettertid. Den nåværende pengepolitiske strategien, der det siktes 
mot at inflasjonen gradvis skal ta seg opp mot 2,5 prosentmålet, er ikke i motsetning til 
forskriften, selv om den innebærer at inflasjonen vil være betydelig lavere enn det 
perasjonelle målet i seks sammenhengende år. o
 
Forskriften for pengepolitikken innebærer at Norges Bank skal sikte mot lav og stabil 
inflasjon og en stabil utvikling i produksjon og sysselsetting. Den lave inflasjonen nå står
ikke i motsetning til disse målsettingene. Det operasjonelle målet på 2,5 prosent inflasjon 
kan ikke rettferdiggjøre en politikk som innebærer betydelig risiko for realøkonomisk 
ustabilitet, og vi tror ikke Norges Bank ville føre en slik politikk. Hvis Norges Bank 
ulle få den oppfatning at lav inflasjon er så vedvarendesk
klare å få inflasjonen opp mot 2,5 prosent, og sam
konomien, så burde Banken be om en ny forskrø
v øre dette i en slik situasjon. Men vi er langt fra en slik situasjon nå. 
ringene 
itteratur om pengepolitikk gir ikke noen entydig anbefaling om i hvilken grad 
ilite
gen i verdipapirmarkeder og boligmarkedet er viktige indikatorer for den 
ige økonomisk utviklingen, og derfor ikke kan neglisjeres i beslutningsprosessen. 
 en kraftig virkning på husholdningene og bedriftenes konsum og 
ringsbeslutninger. Det kan medvirke til betydelig ustabilitet i realøkonomien. 
ksomhet innen en tre års horisont. 
 
N
betydelig risiko for økonomien, og sæ
risstigningstakt ikke kan vedvare. Prp
sannsynlig ved en utflating snarere enn et direkte fall. Dette vil dempe samlet 
etterspørsel, og kan føre til ustabilitet i realøkonomien. Isolert sett tilsier dette en høyer
rente enn det vi har nå. 
 
Fortsatt lav inflasjon, betydelig lavere enn målet på 2,5 prosent, tilsier at renten holdes 
v. Hva bør Norges Bank gjøre? la
 
Den lave inflasjonen medfører ingen vesentlige kostnader for samfunnet. Derimot 
innebærer den lave inflasjonen en mulighet til å redusere arbeidsledigheten til lavere 
nivåer enn det som ellers ville vært mulig. Den sterke pengepolitiske stimuleringen av 
økonomien innebærer en risiko for at oppgangen i økonomien blir for sterk. Den sterke 
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utviklingen i økonomien er enda et tegn på at den pengepolitiske stimulansen burde v
svakere enn det Norges Bank planlegger. 
ære 
 
g. En endring til et annen tallfestet 
flasjonsmål ville gi et misvisende signal om hvordan en fleksibelt inflasjonsmål bør 
l i 
 ligger bak 
ovedstyrets beslutninger. I denne sammenheng savner vi en grundigere diskusjon av 
rbeidsmarkedet og lønnsfastsettelsen, av valutakursen, av inflasjonsforventningene, samt 
nflasjonen. På den andre siden kan enkelte elementer, som 
mmenligningen med enkle regler og utviklingen i pengemengden gjerne utelates fra 
enn den har 
prognose-
m krever lite arbeidskraft, tilsier videre 
ppmerksomhet fra banken. 
virkning på utviklingen i 2005-06. Tilsvarende kan 
eslutningene tatt i 2005 først vurderes når en har sett hvordan økonomien utvikler seg i 
esultatene for produksjonsgapet og inflasjonen i 2003 og 2004 tyder på at 
tatene 
 
n 
 
Den vedvarende lave inflasjonen, betydelig under målet på 2,5 prosent, har fått noen 
observatører til å foreslå at målet bør senkes, for å unngå en ekspansiv pengepolitikk som
innebærer en risiko om ustabilitet i realøkonomien. Vårt syn er at den nåværende 
forskriften gir tilstrekkelig fleksibilitet. En endring av det operasjonelle målet for 
pengepolitikken må ikke ses som en enkel løsnin
in
fungere. 
 
 
Norge Banks pengepolitiske vurderinger og strategi 
 
Ved å publisere de pengepolitiske vurderinger og strategi i begynnelsen av 
strategiperioden har Banken bidratt til økt åpenhet og transparens. Det første kapitte
Inflasjonsrapporten virker som en egnet plassering. Innholdet i de pengepolitiske 
vurderinger og strategi bør presentere og diskutere de viktigste forhold som
H
a
av ulike mål på i
sa
politikkvurderingene.  
 
Viftene som viser usikkerheten ved Bankens prognoser synes å innebære en 
undervurdering av usikkerheten ved slike prognoser. Presentasjoner av usikkerhetsviftene 
bør inkludere et forbehold om at vurderingen av usikkerheten i seg selv er usikker. Hvis 
Banken tror at hendelser den siste tiden tilsier at inflasjonen er mer volatil 
vært tidligere, bør Banken legge ved et forbehold om dette når usikkerhetsviftene 
presenteres. De gode erfaringene med Professor Ragnar Nymoens inflasjons
modell, til tross for en enkel tilnærming so
o
 
 
Pengepolitikken i 2002-2006 
 
Pengepolitikken virker med betydelige etterslep. Pengepolitiske beslutninger tatt i 2002-
04 har derfor fortsatt inn
b
2006 og 2007.  
 
R
pengepolitikken – vurdert i ettertid – var for stram i de foregående 2-3 årene. Resul
for 2005 er ikke like entydige. På den ene side tyder rimelige anslag på Norges Banks
”tapsfunksjon” at en mer ekspansiv politikk ville gitt bedre resultater, på den andre side
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er vi overbevist om at ytterligere rentekutt i 2004 ville ha økt den nåværende risikoen for 
en overoppheting av økonomien.  
 
Gjennom 2005 holdt Norges Bank mer eller mindre fast ved den strategien som ble 
trukket opp allerede i IR 3/04 i november 2004. Slik vi ser det, avspeiler dette delvis at 
Norges Bank utarbeidet gode anslag og gjorde riktige pengepolitiske vurderinger. 
den bemerkelsesverdige konsistensen i strategiene og rentesettingen over de siste 1
månedene kan også forklares med at internasjonal økonomi har tålt økningen i oljepr
de siste årene på en overraskende god måte. I tillegg har de forstyrrelser som har ramm
norsk øko
Men 
6 
isen 
et 
nomi i stor grad at motsatte virkninger på rentesettingen. Mens økningen i 
ljeprisen har bidratt til økningen i innenlandsk etterspørsel, har fortsatte endringer i 
portmønsteret bidratt til å holde importert inflasjon nede. Stabiliteten i Norges Banks 
delspartnere gjenfinnes i 
jennomsnittsanslag fra uavhengige prognosemakere over samme tidsrom.  
 
y 
 tilfelle vil 
ed hva Banken selv ser på som en god måte å sette renten.  
ette 
 er 
bedrifter, er slik åpenhet også antatt å styrke 
engepolitikkens effektivitet.  
med markedet det siste året har vært transparent, 
onsistent og gjennomgående god. Markedsutslagene etter rentemøtene har vært noe 
 Dette har en rekke fordeler, ved at det gir en best mulig illustrasjon av 
en optimale rentebanen, øker pengepolitikkens effektivitet ved å være mer transparent, 
ingsrette 
o
im
anslag gjennom det siste året for veksten hos Norges han
g
 
Norsk økonomi er nå inne i sitt tredje år med vekst over trend. De fleste områdene av 
økonomien vokser, noen relativt hurtig. Arbeidskraftetterspørselen tar seg opp, og
ledigheten er nær historiske bunnivåer. Selv om lønns- og prisveksten så langt er lav, 
taler dagens situasjon for noe strammere pengepolitikk enn Norges Bank nå varsler. Hø
vekst i kreditt og aktivpriser (se kapittel 3) forsterker dette synet. Etter vårt syn er det nå 
større risiko ved å heve for lite, for sent, enn for mye, for tidlig. I førstnevnte
lite og sen renteheving nå øke sannsynligheten for at en senere må heve i større skritt. 
Dette ville være i strid m
 
 
Kommunikasjon 
 
Norges Bank kommuniserer godt. Banken har de siste årene tatt en rekke skritt for å 
bedre sin kommunikasjon med markedet og publikum, og fortsetter å gjøre dette. D
avspeiler - slik vi ser det - en genuin vilje til å være åpen og transparent. Selv om dette 
kan ses i lys av Norges Banks rolle som et offentlig organ, som tar beslutninger som
viktige for husholdninger og 
p
 
Norges Banks kommunikasjon 
k
mindre enn i tidligere år.  
 
Vi bifaller Bankens beslutning om å publisere sin egen renteprognose, med virkning fra 
og med IR 3/05.
d
muliggjør en kryss-sjekk med markedets renteforventninger, og gir forventn
anslag for øvrige variabler. Norges Bank har også fått internasjonal anerkjennelse for 
dette skrittet. Selv om det også er enkelte argumenter mot publisering av en optimal 
rentebane, er det vår vurdering at disse er av mindre relevans.
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